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ABSTRACT
Estonia’s Memory Politics in the Context of European Integration
Marina Suhhoterina

This study examines the process of European integration of Estonia from the
perspective of memory politics. The main assumption of the research is that the Estonian
political elite often refers to the Soviet past of the country and its reflection in Estonian
national memory to frame and guide the political discourse of European integration. In
order to test this hypothesis, I analyze the speeches delivered by the leading representatives
of the Estonian political elite in the process of post-Soviet transformation. The findings of
the study reveal development that is seemingly a paradox. Members of Estonian political
elite have attempted to move away from and maintain continuity with the Soviet past at the
same time. Politicians present the achievements of their country in the process of European
integration as opposed to its Soviet experience, thus stressing the negative side of the latter
and emphasizing the European character of Estonia even more. In the process, politicians
wish to distance Estonia from its communist past and demonstrate that this period was an
aberration for Estonians. At the same time, the Estonian political elite is constantly
reminding the international community of the necessity to recognize and condemn the
communist crimes as was done with regard to the Nazis immediately after the end of World
War II. The findings of my analysis also indicate the gradual change in Estonia’s national
memory narrative from backward to forward-looking. Estonian politicians wish Estonia to
be seen as a European, not post-Soviet country. If in the beginning stages of postcommunist transition the main arguments for this consisted of references to the legal
continuity with the First Republic of Estonia that existed in the interwar period 1918-1940,
then later stages have been characterized by the replacement of the symbols that glorified
the past with the future-oriented image of an innovative nation that can be a model to
follow for other European states.
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INTRODUCTION

Estonia, a small country located in the Northern-Eastern part of Europe on the coast
of the Baltic Sea, is one of the former Soviet Republics that entered the European Union
(hereafter cited as the EU) in May 2004. Estonia represents an interesting case to examine.
The state has undergone very successfully the processes of post-communist transformation
and European integration. Estonia has been fairly considered to be the most eager and
quick learner of the EU practices and supporter of European ideas. Estonia has the lowest
ranks of corruption and highest levels of economic and technological development,
characteristics uncommon for the burdened by the Soviet inheritance states. Estonia was
the first among former Soviet Union republics who joined the Eurozone on 1 st of January
2011. There has always been a question – what factors determined behaviour of Estonia in
the context of European integration. Most common explanations were economic and
security rationales. However, there were some other determinants; one of the most
important was the Soviet inheritance, its reflection in Estonia’s national memory and its
role in the formation of the Estonia’s European discourse. Historical perspectives on
European integration have been paid lesser attention in the literature on this subject. The
study is going to fill this gap and demonstrate Estonia’s transition from a post-communist
to the European country from the point of view of history and memory politics.

The period of existence under the dominance of the communist regime during half
of a century is a painful issue for Estonia and Estonians. The Soviet occupation and the
whole communist period have always been considered as illegal among the Estonian
people. In the collective memory of the nation the Soviet time is reflected as an era of
aberration, discontinuity. After restoration of Estonia’s independence, the political elite of
the country took a straight course directed on fast alienation of Estonia from the Soviet
past. On the beginning stage of post-communist transition, the main goal of the political
elite was to achieve the international recognition of the Republic of Estonia and assure its
security, especially before its biggest neighbour and former oppressor, the Russian
Federation, a successor state of the Soviet Union. In order to demonstrate legitimacy of
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their actions, the Estonian political elite resorted most often to the principle of legal
continuity with the first Republic of Estonia 1918-1940. By this, political actors wished to
distance the country from the Soviet past and move closer to Europe and Western world.
In subsequent years, the Estonian political elite continued its course on
rapprochement with Europe. The main direction of discourse remained the same. Estonian
political elite wished to replace the “dark” Soviet past of their country with the European
present. In order to demonstrate the benefits of potential membership and justify the
necessity of joining the EU, the high political representatives often appealed to the national
memory to find legitimization to their decisions and foreign policy choices. The recent
experience of living under the dominance of the Soviet Union was one of the main
elements of the political discourse on European integration. On the one hand, the Estonian
political elite always emphasized Estonia’s historically determined European, Scandinavian
or Nordic character, stressing by this illegality of the Soviet occupation and the whole
period of the Soviet rule on Estonia’s soil. On the other hand, the Soviet experience was
sometimes presented in a context which placed Estonia above other former communist
republics as well as non-Soviet states as well. Especially, it was the case when politicians
presented achievements of Estonia in different spheres (such as economics, technology,
democratic reforms) during the post-communist transition. Parallel to this line of
arguments, there has been another – the Estonian political discourse on European
integration always contained a demand for international recognition and condemnation of
the communist crimes, as it was done right after the War with the Nazis’ crimes. The
political elite presented it as a necessary precondition for the formation of the strong, stable
and united Europe.

The main purpose of the study is to show development of the Estonia’s discourse on
European integration from the perspective of memory politics. The research is based on the
following questions: how the legacies of the Soviet past have influenced Estonia’s
perception of the EU? How the Estonian political elite have framed the discourse of
European integration of the country? Which role does national memory play in that
process? How the Estonian politicians deal with national memory to formulate and direct
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the process of European integration?

The study is built on an assumption that the Estonian political elite use the Soviet
experience of the country for two separate purposes. On the one hand, emphasizing
negative aspects of the Soviet time and contraposing those with Estonia’s success and
achievements in post-communist transitional period, the Estonian politicians present the
Soviet experience as an accelerator of European integration and “Europeaness” of the
country. By this, they wish to break away from the Soviet past, to distance as far as possible
from it and to replace the Soviet past with European present. On the other hand, the
political elite continue to stress the illegality of the Soviet occupation, presenting the Soviet
time as an era of aberration for Estonians and demanding international recognition and
condemnation of the communist crimes. By this, politicians preserve and maintain the
continuity of the Soviet past in Estonia.

The main goal on the study is to control this assumption and find out whether it is
justified or not. In order to do that, I examine the speeches delivered by the high
representatives of the Estonian political elite in the process of post-Soviet transformation.
The analysis is divided into four parts and represents the gradual transition of Estonia from
a post-communist state towards a member of the EU: “de-Sovietization,” “application,”
“negotiation,” and “membership.” The analysis demonstrates the way how the Estonian
political elite has formulated and guided the discourse of European integration in the
context of historical legacies of the past and national memory. Also, the study reveals
different rhetoric methods politicians use in order to legitimize certain political decisions
and implied policies. As a result, the analysis demonstrates appeared changes and shifts in
the national discourse and explains the prepositions and causes for that.

The study consists of five parts: introduction, the main body divided into three
chapters, and conclusion. The chapters are in turn divided into sections. The first chapter
develops a theoretical framework for the research introducing the concept of collective
memory and its interaction with the political power. The first chapter contains also a
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description of the methodology the study is based on. The second chapter demonstrates the
main principles European collective memory and Estonian national memory are built on.
The chapter reveals a divergence between European and Estonian memory and explains the
main reasons for that. Also, the chapter defines primary historical factors that have
influenced the process of European integration of Estonia. The third chapter is analytical; it
applies the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter to the empirical data
collected for the analysis. The findings of the analysis demonstrate the mutual dependence
of memory and political power and provide the answers to the main research questions and
assumptions of the study.

The study is interdisciplinary. It combines examination of two independent
concepts, memory and politics, and their interaction. The importance of memory studies is
constantly growing and becoming multi-dimensional. In Estonia, the significance of that
topic rapidly increased together with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then, national
memory and history that had been suppressed during a half of the century long period were
finally unfrozen. A number of historians, political and social science scholars focused their
attention on the investigation of memory and its interaction with other disciplines, such as
history, culture, social and political sphere. Many academic works were dedicated to the
examination of divergence of memories that existed in the Estonian Soviet Socialist
Republic during the Soviet time and its influence on the post-communist period.1 Kirsti
Jõesalu, Ene Kõresaar, Tiina Kirss, Marju Lauristin dealt with the individual memories of
the people living in Estonia during the Soviet period and their reflection in subsequent postSoviet era. Yuri Lotman and Marek Tamm approached the topic of memory from the
perspective of culture. Due to the fact, that Estonia still has troubled relations and some
unresolved issues2 with its former oppressor, the successor state of the Soviet Union, the
Russian Federation, a lot of academic works have been dedicated to that problem. Maria
Mälksoo examined the conflicting memory politics in the Baltic States in the process of
European integration focusing on the Soviet inheritance on the one hand and on the current
1

Under the communist regime, the Estonian people (as well as citizens of other former Soviet republics) were
forced to adopt a Soviet vision of history and replace national history interpretation by the Soviet.
2
For example, a question of borders between those two states.
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Russian-Estonian relations on the other. Some of the political events of recent years gave
an additional impact to investigate the interaction of memory and politics in Estonia. In
May 2005, there was a commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War
II in Moscow. The leaders of two Baltic States, Estonian President Arnold Rüütel and
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, denied an invitation of the Russian President
Vladimir Putin to take part in the ceremony. It was a turning point in Estonia’s memory
politics. Eva-Clarita Onken analyzed this occurrence in her study and demonstrated the
consequences it could have for the future. Another important moment in Estonia’s memory
politics was a relocation of the World War II monument, the “Bronze Soldier,” in the
Estonian capital Tallinn in August 2007. This incident caused a lot of controversies and
fueled fierce discussion in media, politics, public sphere. Many scholars (such as Marko
Lehti, Jörg Hackmann, David J. Smith, Alexander Astrov) investigated this topic as well as
possible consequences of the incident on Russian-Estonian relations, on the situation with
the Russian minority in Estonia, on Estonia’s international image.
For the most part, the previously conducted studies on memory politics in Estonia
with regards to its Soviet past analyzed the problem in the light of current Russian-Estonian
relations. The main focus of this research is the process of European integration of Estonia.
The goal of this study is to find out how the Soviet experience has influenced Estonia’s
position towards Europe and the European Union and how the political elite of the country
deal with the Soviet legacies in the process of European integration. In this study, the
minimal attention is given to the current Estonian-Russian bilateral relations, though their
importance is not underestimated in any way.

The possible limitations of the research are caused by the established page limits for
this kind of study. First, I take into consideration only the most important factors, omitting
the elements that are out of the focus of the study (though they might seem to be important
from the general perspective). Second limitation concerns the empirical data for the
analysis. In order to do the research more homogenous, I decided to examine only the
speeches and statements that are found directly on the websites of the President of the
Republic, the Government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The spectrum of the
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political figures has also some limitations. The analysis contains only speeches delivered by
the Presidents of the Republic, the Prime Ministers and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in
the period 1991-2011 as those actors are the most important representatives of the Republic
in domestic and international affairs. Also, they have the biggest influence in the EUrelated decision-making. The research does not include statements made by the members of
European Institutions (e.g. the European Parliament) who represent Estonia there since the
country joined the EU. Though it may seem important to include them also into the
analysis, I prefer not to do it in order to maintain the uniformity of research in the course of
all four stages of post-communist transition.

6

CHAPTER 1: COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL
POWER

In the current chapter, I develop a theoretical framework and define the main
concepts of the study which are memory and politics. I reveal the meaning of the term
“collective memory,” demonstrate how memory and political power are related to each
other and dependent on each other. The last part of the chapter describes methodology the
study is built on. In this part, I explain how I conducted the analysis and dealt with the main
research concepts.

1.1 The Meaning of the Term “Collective Memory”

As a theoretical term, collective memory was first approached by a French
philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in 1925. He was the first who juxtaposed
individual disciplines of history and memory and developed the concept of collective
memory. 3 Many other scholars based their research on Halbwachs’ assumptions and
arguments. Nowadays, there are thousands of articles and other academic works on the
topic which shows its continuing relevance. 4

Due to its ambiguity and multisided nature, there is no single definition of the
concept “collective memory.”5 Aleida Assmann argues that it is too vague to serve as a
critical term. 6 She suggests to define it through the functions collective memory plays in
society; as an “umbrella term for different formats of memory that need to be further
distinguished.”7 Assmann develops four main categories, or formats of memory, that allow
to classify and range different types of memory (such as individual, family, social, political,

3

Marek Tamm, “History as Cultural Memory: Mnemohistory and the Construction of the Estonian
Nation,” Journal of Baltic Studies 39 (2008): 500.
4
William Hirst and David Manier, “Towards a Psychology of Collective Memory,” Memory 16 (2008): 183.
5
The concept “collective memory” has been used in many fields: psychology, anthropology, history, political
and social science.
6
Hirst and Manier, 184.
7
Aleida Assmann, “Transformations Between History and Memory,” Social Research 75 (2008): 55.
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national, cultural, interactive group memory). These formats involve individual, social,
political, and cultural memory; among them, three latter formats are components of
collective memory. 8 Individual and social memories are short-term, and disappear together
with their carriers. On the contrast, political and cultural memories are long-term, based on
the more durable carriers of external symbols and representations. In order to transform
short-term memories into long-term and transfer them thereafter from generation to
generation, short-term memory has to be organized and institutionalized. The main means
for that include formation of mobilizing narratives; various visual and verbal signs that
serve as aids of memory; creation of the institutions of learning and the dissemination of
mass media; erection of sites and monuments of remembrance, and organization of
commemoration rites and other practices to reactivate the memory and enhance collective
participation. All those means serve to transform implicit, heterogeneous, fuzzy bottom-up
memory into explicit, homogenous, institutionalized, formalized top-down memory. 9 Based
on simplified version of own categorization, Aleida Assmann distinguishes also two forms
of participation in collective memory: informal social memory and the more formal and
organized political memory. Transition from social to political memory appears when
“abstract and generalized “history” turns into re-embodied collective “memory”, when it is
transformed into forms of shared knowledge and collective participation.” 10 Those two
features [shared knowledge and collective participation] are thus the main elements of
long-term political memory. As a result of that process, “history in general” becomes not
only emotionally coloured “our history,” but also a part of collective identity.
Typology of collective memory by Jan Assmann is rather different. He distinguishes
between material, mimetic, communicative, and cultural memory. 11 Similarly to Aleida
Assmann, Jan Assmann also refers to short- and long-term memory and transmission from
one level to another. In his analysis, the short-term applies to communicative and long-term
8

Aleida Assmann, “Four Formats of Memory: From Individual to Collective Constructions of the Past” in
Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness in the German-Speaking World Since 1500 (Papers from the
Conference “The Fragile Tradition,” Cambridge 2002. Volume 1), ed. by Christian Emden and David R.
Midgley (Oxford: P. Lang, 2004), 22.
9
A. Assmann, 2008, 55-56.
10
A. Assmann, 2008, 65.
11
Material memory, based on objects; mimetic memory, based on imitation; communicative memory, based
on oral discussion; and cultural memory, based on written and visual carriers of information (Tamm, 500).
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– to cultural memory. Wulf Kansteiner agrees with Jan Assmann’s classification and
juxtaposition of communicative and cultural memory. He complements Assmann’s
definition of cultural memory that “serves to cultivate and convey society’s self-image”
with own arguments. According to Kansteiner, the elements of cultural memory, such as
texts, rites images, buildings, monuments, “are designed to recall fateful events in the
history of the collective.”12
Another crucial moment in the study of collective memory is a role of individual
memories. Is it justified to consider collective memory as a set of organized individual
memories which would allow to regard individual memories also as a part of collective?
According to Irwin-Zarecka, it is not: collective memory is not “a collection of individual
memories or some magically constructed reservoir of ideas and images, but rather a
socially articulated and socially maintained “reality of the past.”13 J. Assmann’s distinction
between communicative and cultural memories also refers to his tendency to locate
collective memories outside the individual. 14 William Hirst and David Manier do not deny
the importance of individual memories in formation of collective; however, similarly to A.
Assmann they emphasize first, the shared character of them, and second, the element of
identity: “we have treated collective memories as shared individual memories that shape
collective identity.”15 Duncan Bell also pays special attention to the notion of “shared,”
opposing that kind of memory to “common” memory.16 Bell defines the latter as “the sum
of the total number of memories of an event within a community, and it does not require
communication or generate intersubjective meanings.” On the contrast, shared memory
relies on communication in order to fulfill its main goal – integration and calibration of
different memories of people about a particular event or episode into one version.
Kansteiner also emphasizes the element of “shared communications about the meaning of
12

Communicative memory in Jan Assmann’s approach is reduced to everyday communication about the
meaning of the past; communicative memory duration is limited by 80-100 years; it is disorganized, unstable,
and strongly influenced by contemporary events (Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”
in New German Critique 65 (1995): 132; see also Wolf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A
Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” History and Theory 41 (2002): 182).
13
Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: the Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick
[N.J.]: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 54.
14
Hirst and Manier, 185.
15
Hirst and Manier, 196.
16
Duncan Bell, “Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory,” Constellations 15 (2008): 155.
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the past” in construction of collective memory. 17 Olick suggests that in order to be treated
as “collective,” but not just “collected” memory, it first, has to be widely held by members
of a community, and second, it should be really meaningful for them.18
As A. Assmann points out, the step from individual memories towards shared
collective memory can not be regarded as an easy analogy. Collectives, communities, as
well as other larger social groups (nations, states) and different institutions those social
groups belong to (political, governmental, religious, private) do not really “have” a
memory, they “make” one for themselves with the help of various components, or signs, of
memory such as symbols, ceremonies, rituals, monuments.19 In that sense, among
abovementioned formats of memory political memory seems to be the most “collective” as
it not only generates a meaning of particular facts, but does it together with a sense of
loyalty and a strongly unifying “we-identity.”20 As Eva-Clarita Onken argues, such
collective identity does not need anymore the actual historical circumstances surrounding
experiences of a group of people (a nation) to survive and develop. Rather, those
experiences create a ground for formation of simplified narratives and myths of the
political community that transcend the lifetime of individuals and even generations. Thus,
from short-term, memories transform into long-term and become institutionalized. This
process influences not only interpretation of the past events, but also prescribes the way of
understanding the present and future.
Abovementioned chain of transformations from individual to collective political
memory demonstrates the relevance of latter for a larger society. Further, I show the
functioning of political memory on the national level and reveal its influence and
interconnection with identity formation as well as the role of political memory in domestic
and foreign decision-making processes.

17

Kansteiner, 188.
Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory 17 (1999): 343; see also
Kansteiner, 186.
19
A. Assmann, 2004, 25-26.
20
Eva-Clarita Onken, “Memory and Democratic Pluralism in the Baltic States - Rethinking the Relationship,”
Journal of Baltic Studies 41 (2010): 280-281.
18
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1.2 National (Collective) Memory

Interaction between memory, identity formation and politics on national level
demonstrates the complex relation between short-term social and long-term political
memory. National collective memory is shared by individuals and institutionalized by a
state. It not only defines national identity, but also fosters cohesion within a nation and
prescribes its action. 21
At national level, there are two main types of collective memory. Heiko Pääbo
refers to them as primary and mediated memory; Jan-Werner Müller defines them as mass
individual memory and national memory; Timothy Snyder distinguishes between “mass
personal memory” on the one hand, and a sort of a principle to “organize the history” on
the other.22 The former is the recollection of events by a number of individuals in which
they have actually participated and lived through. The latter is a framework through which
“nationally conscious individuals can organize their history.” Müller claims that it is
possible to regard the second type of collective memory as a myth; however, he admitted
that such approach might be misleading.23
The main focus of my study is on the second type of national collective memory,
which is “mediated,” directed on the “organization of history.” This memory is based on
and functions through national history narratives, or nations’ master narratives. The master
narrative shapes nation’s collective memory; it binds the elements stored in memory into
one meaningful sequence.24 National narrative serves as a bridge between past and present,
past and future, as well as present and future. It enables people to understand the past of
their nation, providing necessary explanations for the past events and their reflections and
21

Heiko Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial
Space. Comparison of Russian Master Narrative with Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian Master Narratives
(Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2011), 33.
22
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space, 33;
Jan-Werner Müller, ed., Memory and Power in Post-War Europe Studies in the Presence of the Past
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2002), 3; Timothy Snyder, “Memory of Sovereignty and
Sovereignty Over Memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-1999” in Memory and Power in Post-War
Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, ed. by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002): 39.
23
Müller, 3.
24
Tamm, 502-505.
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connections with the present and future.25 Besides mnemonic functions, national history
narratives are also involved in reproduction of the national identity and nation-building,
telling a story “which depicts the nation as a unified group moving through history, even in
the case if it does not fully correspond to the reality.” 26 The narrative provides nation’s past
with coherence; it presents nations as an entity with unified destiny and interests; it also
establishes a boundary between members and non-members, between those sharing the
common past and those who do not.27 The portrait of the nation created by the narrative
might be distorted and misleading, even if the events and evidence they are based on are
truthful. 28
An important role in formation of the national history narrative, as well as
construction of the nation and national identity plays conceptual pair of Self and Other.
Duncan Bell claims that while acting together, Self and Other, or us and them, create a
“mutually supporting scaffolds” for national identity construction.29 Some scholars, such as
Göran Therborn and Emmanuel Lévinas, demonstrate even higher relevance of the concept
of Other than Self in that process. The former argues that “there is a primacy of otherness
over sameness in the making of identity.”30 The latter presents an image of Self as
derivative from the appearance of Other, claiming that the face of Other calls the Self into
existence.31 Lévinas emphasizes the exteriority and alterity of Other with regards to Self,
referred to the relationship between Self and Other as a Mystery. However, at the same time
he stresses that there is a resemblance between Self and Other, “one is for the other what
the other is for oneself,” “the other is known through sympathy, as another (my)self, as the
alter ego.”32
However, there is also an opposite viewpoint on Self/Other nexus. If Lévinas
25

Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: the Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64-65.
26
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 39.
27
Tamm, 502; Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 40.
28
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 39.
29
Duncan Bell, “Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity,” British Journal of Sociology 54
(2003): 67.
30
Göran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: the Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000
(London: Sage Publications, 1995), 229.
31
Iver B. Neumann, Uses of other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1999), 16.
32
Emmanuel Lévinas and Seán Hand, The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 47.
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presents Other “as something on the order of an angel,” some scholars suggest that Other
seem to be hell. 33 Another perspective to regard interaction between Self and Other is to
contrast them, most commonly as “positive Self vs negative Other” and/or “the Other is
what I myself am not.”34 Such viewpoint is widespread in international relations,
nationalism and identity studies. According to Pääbo, in the process of construction of
national identity Self needs Other that is the mirror-image to Self. 35 In case of newly
established or newly independent states that had an experience of foreign dominance, the
contraposition of Self against Other is especially evident. The narratives about heroic
struggle of formerly suppressed nations (positive Self) against their external ruler (negative
Other) justify their “historical duty to live freely and to be sovereign.”36 Violence of the
past, often presented as “victimization” of the nation finds its reflection in national
narratives. In some cases victimization may have a greater impact on strengthening of
national identity, rather than on glorifying past narratives. 37 Also, such way of construction
of a nation is very selective. Usually, only the episodes that support the positive image of
Self are included into the national narrative. What does not maintain the heroic pattern is
passed over and forgotten.38 Also, A. Assmann makes an important remark about being a
victim as a result of defeat or trauma. The scholar claims that the concept of trauma can not
be integrated into a heroic narrative since it “threatens and shatters the constitution of a
vigorous self-image,” “trauma is the other of heroic narrative.”39
Another controversial moment with regards to the Self/Other nexus is a multiplicity
of Others. Lévinas sees it as a problem, questioning what to do in case of many Others,
how to define the concept of Other in general and understand who is the closest Other to

33

Neumann, 23.
Neumann, 17.
35
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 41.
36
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 42.
37
Pääbo, Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts, 42.
38
A. Assmann, 2004, 26.
39
Assmann, distinguished between being defeated in history and being a victim of history. An example in the
first case might be victims of war who actively resisted their enemy, but still were defeated. The second case
refers to those who by historical coincidence were exposed to violence and sufferings without any means to
resistance and self-defence. Respectively, if in the former case sufferings or death of victims might be
presented as a heroic act of martyrdom or sacrifice, no heroic memory could be constructed in the latter case
(A. Assmann, 2004, 28).
34
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Self. 40 On the contrary to Lévinas, Pille Petersoo does not see any obstacle with the
multiplicity of Others, considering it rather as a normal state of affairs. Petersoo introduces
four “ideal types” of Other: internal positive Other, internal negative Other, external
positive Other, external negative Other, claiming that several Others can coexist at the same
time.41
The interaction between concepts of Self and Other plays an important role in the
formation of national memory and national identity. It has an influence on past and present,
and interpretation of different events. In further chapters I demonstrate the impact and
reflection of the nexus Self/Other in the process of political decision-making.

1.3 Interaction Between Memory and Political Power

As interaction between memory and political power, as well as reflection of
memory in politics is in the focus of this study, it is necessary to clearly define the relation
between those two concepts. Heidemarie Uhl suggests an idea to regard memory as politics
in order to understand the potential influence of these phenomena on each other.42 As
noticed above, Aleida Assmann distinguishes between bottom-up social and top-down
political memory which allows her to reveal penetration, transformation and functioning of
different kinds of memory on the political level.
Eva-Clarita Onken demonstrates four primary ways how memories can be
manifested in the public-political sphere.43 First, in the form of political measures which
explicitly deal with the past through justice and accountability policies. One of the
preconditions for that form of manifestation is a change of political regime in the country
which may also cause a replacement of old political elites by new. Under these conditions,
political actors apply to various legislative practices with a purpose to establish a particular
40
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interpretation and evaluate what was right or wrong under the previous regime.
Another clear case of political memory are public speeches and statements by high
representatives of political elite (heads of states and government) in which they create
historical analogies to the past in order to justify or legitimize current policies. In their
speeches, political actors use different rhetoric methods combined with sonorous arguments
and justification to certain political decisions which allows them to create an appropriate
framework and provide some “guidelines” how the past is “officially” remembered.
The third form of manifestation of memory in the political sphere are public
representations and rituals, or material and procedural symbolic forms of commemoration,
as A. Assmann also classifies them. 44 The former includes the erection of monuments,
naming the streets, schools, and other public institutions, foundation of museums. The latter
represents various ceremonies, rituals and practices of commemoration, as public burial
rites for example. By the means of such symbolic attention, the political elite together with
some other state actors and non-governmental agents can control and direct the ways how
the past is understood and interpreted, how past events are remembered and
commemorated.45 Politicians are in charge of establishing particular traditions and events
of commemorations, and national anniversaries. Similarly to the mnemonic manifestations
in high politics, public representations and rituals also allow political elite to establish a
way the past is remembered as well as to guide the whole process of remembrance.
Three abovementioned cases demonstrate the top-down approach to regard the
nexus between memory and politics. There is also other way to examine relationship
between these two concepts, from the perspective of bottom-up memory. It is the fourth
form of Onken’s classification. The author distinguishes different ways how social groups
may assert their influence in the public-political sphere. One of them appears when various
groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities, certain professional communities, war
veterans), who have particular interpretation of the past, feel that their memories are being
mis- or underrepresented in official narratives and policies. 46 In order to achieve
44
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recognition and acknowledgement of their interpretation of the past on the state level
(through symbolic politics, apologies) these social groups seek for opportunities to
represent their interest in the democratic state institutions and procedures. For instance,
they may find some mediator from the political world who would not only represent their
interests, but also contribute to the inclusion of their memories into the national political
memory. Another way is active lobbying among policy makers with the aim to change
public perceptions and/or legislation and incorporate their experiences into the public
discourses. One more possibility is a direct participation of some representative of a social
group with particular memories in decision-making process and construction of political
memory of the state. These examples show that memory can influence and create a basis
for political and group identities among different interest groups which may be translated
into political action and direct participation. In some cases, as a result of such activity,
bottom-up social memory transforms into top-down political memory.

The main focus of this study is manifestation of memory on the level of high
politics. In order to examine this interaction, I rely on theoretical assumptions developed by
Müller. The latter suggests to regard memory as a power, whether “symbolic” or
“structural.” Such conceptualization allows him to examine how memory is involved in the
process of policy-making both in terms of construction and legitimization of foreign
policies as well as the contestation of domestic politics. 47
Legitimacy is the primary link that connects memory and political power. Policies
are justified through appeals to the collective or national memory and legitimized on the
grounds of historical experience.48 Such “mnemonic legitimation” can be based on both:
continuity as well as on a break with the past.49 Usage of national history narrative and
myths of the past in the process of policy-making is one of the manifestations of memory as
the “symbolic power.” Memory as the “structural power” may be reflected in the agenda
setting by political elites. The latter are those who decide how to frame, present, interpret,
47
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draw attention on, or on the contrary, avoid particular events or topics that are important
from the point of view of a state, nation, society in general. Memory also determines events
and persons that are “worth remembering” and that should be forgotten. It is a process of
constructing meaning. As Martha Minow points out: “the alternation of forgetting and
remembering itself etches the path of power.”50
Besides legitimacy, another important element that binds memory and political
power, are historical analogies. The political elite usually reflect the dominant version of
collective memory and build political discourse on historical analogies. Thus, memory is
neither a vessel of truth nor just a mirror of interests. Definitely, policy-makers can use
memory for their own benefits, however, they still have to rely on the historical past and
the memory that shapes it. Politicians have power over memory, and memory also has
power over them.51

Based on this theoretical framework, the further analysis will demonstrate how the
Estonian political elite deal with the national memory in the process of policy- and
decision-making. It will show both forms of manifestation of memory on the level of high
politics – as a “structural” and “symbolic” power. The study will reveal interdependency of
these two concepts and the influence one can assert on another.

1.4 Methodology

The empirical data for the analysis are speeches delivered by three high
representatives of the Estonian political elite: the President, the Prime Minister, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. All of them have a great influence on the domestic affairs and
formation of the international image of the country. The President is the head of the state,
the highest representative of the Republic in international affairs. Since Estonia is a
parliamentary republic, the role of the president is rather symbolic; the actual political head
of the state and government is the Prime Minister, who is responsible for decision-making,
50
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both in domestic and foreign politics. As European integration and membership in the EU
has been one of the main foreign policy priorities of Estonia and the coordination of the
EU-related issues passes through the Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the speeches
delivered by its head, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, are also included into the study.

The timeframe for collecting of empirical data is a period from the year 1991 until
2011 (from the restoration of independence of Estonia on 20th of August 1991 until
present). During that time, there have been three Presidents: Lennart Meri (in office from
October 1992 until October 2001), Arnold Rüütel (October 2001 – October 2006), and
Toomas Hendrik Ilves (current President, in office since October 2006); eight prime
ministers: Edgar Savisaar (in office from August 1991 until January 1992), Tiit Vähi
(January 1992 – October 1992), Mart Laar (October 1992 – November 1994), Andres
Tarand (November 1994 – April 1995), Tiit Vähi (April 1995 – March 1997), and Mart
Siimann (March 1997 – March 1999), Mart Laar (March 1999 – January 2002), Siim
Kallas (January 2002 – April 2003), Juhan Parts (April 2003 – April 2005), and Andrus
Ansip (current Prime Minister, in office since April 2005); and eleven Ministers of Foreign
Affairs: Lennart Meri (in office from April 1990 until March 1992), Jaan Manitski (April
1992 – October 1992), Trivimi Velliste (October 1992 – January 1994), Jüri Luik (January
1994 – April 1995), Riivo Sinijärv (April 1995 – November 1995), Siim Kallas (November
1995 – November 1996), Toomas Hendrik Ilves (November 1996 – October 1998), Raul
Mälk (October 1998 – March 1999), Toomas Hendrik Ilves (March 1999 – January 2002),
Kristiina Ojuland (January 2002 – February 2005), Rein Lang (February 2005 – April
2005), and Urmas Paet (current Minister of Foreign Affairs, in office since April 2005). 52

The main purpose of the study is to trace development of the Estonia’s discourse on
European integration from the perspective of memory politics. The goal is to observe how
52
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the discourse has been constructed, operated and changed during the twenty years of
independent statehood; what is the role of memory and traumatic legacies of the Soviet past
and how they have been reflected in the current policy-making process.
The study is based on the assumption that the Estonian political elite use the Soviet
past of Estonia for two separate purposes. On the one hand, they present the Soviet
experience as an accelerator of European integration and “Europeaness” of the country
aiming to break away from the Soviet past and replace it with European present. However,
at the same time the Estonian politicians maintain the continuity of the Soviet past
constantly bringing to mind the illegality of the Soviet occupation and demanding
international recognition and condemnation of the communist crimes.

I use the method of deductive reasoning to collect the empirical data for the study.
To begin with the analysis, first I look through a number of speeches to test the suitability
of my assumption and get some general picture. Then I establish three main criteria, or
keywords, for selection of speeches: Identity, Baltic and Communism. Those are the main
operational concepts I build my analysis on. The goal is to observe how the reflection of
these concepts in the political discourse has changed during the period 1991-2011.
The Identity-centered criterion is related to following questions to be examined in
the speeches: Who we (Estonians) are? Where we belong to? Why should we be considered
as Europeans? What are the main factors that facilitate it (economic success, historical ties,
cultural similarity/connection)? One of the Identity sub-divisions is Other/Self criterion: I
select the speeches where I find a contraposition of negative Other (The Soviet Union)
against Positive Self (Estonia) or Positive Other (Europe, the EU, Finland, Sweden). The
main research question and purpose here is to define why and how the Soviet time and
practices were/are bad, whereas European is good for the people of Estonia?
The Baltic-centered criterion is aimed to trace the change of meaning of the concept
of Baltic during the post-communist transition in Estonia and demonstrate appeared shifts
from the Estonia’s point of view. Next chapters of the study explain the relevance of this
term for the discussion and further analysis.
The

Communism-centered

criterion
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reflects

the

attitude

towards

the

Soviet/communist experience and its remembrance as an element of Estonia’s political
discourse. Also, it shows the ways how the Estonian political elite deal with the legacies of
the Soviet past (including crimes of the regime) on the international level.

The main keywords I draw attention when I reading speeches are: Soviet,
Communist/Communism,

Totalitarian,

Europe/European,

European

Union,

Baltic,

Nordic/Scandinavian. I observe how those concepts are presented with relation to each
other; what aspects political actors usually avoid or, on the contrast, emphasize in their
speeches; whether there is any indirect message behind the official rhetoric.
Besides this, I also have in mind six arguments, or operational concepts, introduced
by Evald Mikkel and Geoffrey Pridham in their study examining the Referendums on EU
Accession in Estonia and Latvia. 53 The scholars identify them as “pro-EU accession
arguments,” which are National Sovereignty/Independence, Security, Economic, European
Values/Standards, Historical, the Future. When doing my research I also mark how
abovementioned concepts have been presented and framed in speeches by high political
representatives.
The analytical part of the study is divided into four parts: de-Sovietization,
“application,” “negotiation,” and “membership.” This periodization is developed by
combining the approaches of David J. Smith and Karen Henderson and accommodating
them for Estonia’s case. 54
53
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The study does not include speeches and statements by all political representatives
mentioned above. The primary explanation for that are established criteria for the research.
The analysis contains only those speeches, interviews, references, remarks and statements
that match the criteria and are in focus of the study. Also, the time one or another political
representative held an office matters too. Thus, for example Riivo Sinijärv had been the
Minister of Foreign Affairs only for seven months, whereas Kristiina Ojuland – for almost
three years, Toomas Hendrik Ilves – for five years, and Urmas Paet – for more than six
years. The list of speeches also demonstrates that some elite representatives are cited more
often than others, as for example, Lennart Meri, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Mart Laar. One of
the explanations to this is again a total duration of their time of service (Lennart Meri – ten
years as a President of the Republic, Toomas Hendrik Ilves – five years as a Minister of
Foreign Affairs and five years as a President, Mart Laar – five years as a Prime Minister).
Another explanation is their activity on domestic and international level.
The theoretical framework developed in the current chapter creates a basis for
further analysis. It explains the main principles of interaction between memory and
political power and manifestations of memory in high politics. In order to proceed with the
analytical part, I find it necessary to provide an overview of European collective memory
and Estonian national memory and reveal some discrepancies existing between them. It
facilitates understanding of the whole research idea as well as assumptions and findings of
the analysis. For the same reason I include into the study a brief description of the main
historical preconditions that have shaped the process post-communist transition and
European integration of Estonia.
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CHAPTER 2: ESTONIA’S MEMORY IN EUROPEAN MNEMONIC LANDSCAPE

The current chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the
European collective memory and the main patterns of its formation with regards to the
World War II remembrance. This part contains an explanation why memory is still dividing
Europe into two parts as it used to be in the post-war period. Also, it describes the main
events, principles and regimes the European collective memory is based on and shows how
the Eastern enlargement of the EU has challenged the European memory space.
The second part provides overview of the Estonia’s national memory and the key
elements it is built on. This part involves examination of the process of formation of
national history narrative, memory and identity of Estonians. It also explains how a
conceptual pair Self/Other has influenced identity and memory construction.
Juxtaposition of the first and second parts of the chapter reveals the obvious
divergence between European and Estonian collective memory and indicates the main
causes for that. The third part demonstrates how this divergence and the particular moments
of Estonia’s past are reflected in the process of European integration of Estonia.

2.1.1 Memory as a Dividing Line Between Western and Central – Eastern Europe

The collective memory space of the European Union has been challenged by the
last, fifth enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, when a number of former postcommunist republics were accepted as members. World War II and the post-war period
divided Europe into two rival camps: capitalist Western Europe and communist Eastern
Europe. The end of the War brought victory to former, and occupation to latter. A different
level of economic and socio-political development was not the only dividing line between
the Western and Eastern European states. The psychological gap reflected in divergence of
their history and memory narratives appeared to be even more challengeable. The process
of European integration moderated some of the economic, political and judicial differences
between the new and old members. However, institutional and bureaucratic requirements of
the EU could not overturn their psychological perceptions. Memory still distinguishes
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Western Europeans from their Eastern counterparts.
Undoubtedly, World War II was one of the most significant events in European
history. Dan Diner referred to the war as to the foundational event in a Uniting Europe.55 In
fact, it was. First of all, World War II united people and nation-states in terms of enormous
losses and destruction it brought. Second, the post-war period reconciled and united the
former enemies and led to the formation of one of the most important international
organizations, the European Coal and Steel Community, a predecessor of the European
Union, in 1951.
However, that unity and reconciliation did not apply to the whole Europe, but only
to its Western part. For Central and Eastern Europe, the war did not end in 1945 with the
defeat of the main “evil” of Europe – Adolf Hitler. Central and Eastern Europeans fell
under the communist regime of another ideological tyrant, Joseph Stalin, and existed under
the foreign dominance until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Even now, when 65
years have already passed after the end of the war, some of the legacies of that period still
continue to assert their influence. In particular, it applies to the politics of memory, ongoing
debates on restitution, truth reconciliation and war remembrance in Europe. As Diner points
out, “World War II never ended.”56 Richard N. Lebow supports this argument, referring to
the politics of memory in postwar Europe and arguing that it has an obvious starting point –
1945, some crucial turning points – 1968, 1979, 1991, but no endpoint.57 If fact, some of
the war-related issues still remain unresolved. Recognition and condemnation of the
communist crimes, committed during and after World War II in the former Soviet republics
is one of them.
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2.1.2 The Patchwork of European Memories

Maria Mälksoo, Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger distinguish four
major communities in the European memory landscape with regards to the World War II
remembrance: an Atlantic-Western European (former Western military opponents of
Germany), German-speaking West-Central Europe, East-Central Europe, and the Eastern
European states of the Russian Federation. The patterns of their remembrance are very
different: D-Day of 1944 and the Allied Victory in Europe on 8th of May 1945 in case of
Atlantic-Western European community; deep traumas resulting from the experience of two
dictatorships, bombing raids and total defeat in case of German-speaking West-Central
Europe; experience of two occupations (Nazi and Soviet) and subsequent existence under
the Soviet control in case of Central and Eastern European countries; and the victory in
“The Great Patriotic War” in Russian case.58

The third category, the East-Central European memory community is the focus of
this study. Within this group, there are also some sub-divisions. The Baltic States, Croatia
and Slovakia have a clear anti-Soviet consensus. States such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Ukraine and Slovenia are characterized by the open conflicts and controversial
reworking of the past. Ambivalence or apathy toward the communist past can be found in
Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. 59 In Bulgaria and Romania, continuity with the Soviet
period has been preserved to some extent, whereas in Belarus and Moldavia the memory of
the socialist period is still a source of identity-building.60
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2.1.3 Determinants of the European Collective Memory

The Holocaust is often referred as the main element of the European collective
memory. Identification with Europe is presented as “a refutation of a Europe occupied,
exploited, and oppressed by a murderous Nazi regime in a disastrous war accompanied by
unfathomable war crimes, and a Europe ravished by genocide and a Holocaust perpetrated
by Nazi Germany.”61 There are a number of “memory regimes” explaining the dynamics of
formation of the Holocaust-centered approach. One such regime – “a common European
currency” – emerged immediately after the end of the war; the main foundation for it was
the consensus on Germany’s sole guilt for the atrocities of the World War II and the
Holocaust.62 Another memory discourse was the historical myth of national resistance and
victim status of all formerly occupied countries. Both discourses were dominant until 1970s
in Western Europe. Afterwards, there was a shift from a “history of the victors” to a
“history of the victims”; the period of the Holocaust as a “common unifying memory”
started. The Holocaust was presented as an act of barbarism, against which European unity
has to be strengthened.63 Over the course of the past thirty years this memory discourse
transformed and was universalized, reaching far beyond the paradigm of Jewish experience
of catastrophe. Pierre Nora described this situation as “whoever says memory, says
Shoah.”64
The Holocaust theme has been institutionalized, cultivated, regarded whether as an
“arch-event” or the “negative core event of the 20th century.”65 Legacies of crimes
committed under Nazism and Fascism during World War II were systematically approached
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and analyzed. 66 The establishment of the Task Force for International cooperation on
Holocaust Education by the EU developed common curriculum on Holocaust studies.67
Despite the fact that majority of the European countries have adopted and agreed on the
institutionalization of the Holocaust Remembering (construction of specific museums and
monuments, establishment of a specific Holocaust Memorial Day etc.), this issue in general
still causes a lot of disputes.

2.1.4 Eastern Enlargement of the EU and European Collective Memory

The fall of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the EU eastern
enlargement in 2004/2007 brought a number of competing memory regimes into the
European collective memory space. One of them is based on the argument equalizing
barbarism and cruelty of the Nazi crimes with the atrocities committed by the Soviets
during and after World War II.68 Emergence of this memory regime is explained by the
uneven attention given to these two oppressors. First, in the contrast to Nazism, the
communist regimes in the former Soviet bloc and their traumatic repercussions for
contemporary politics have not received comparable academic examination.69 The
memories and legacies of communism are still controversial in the European
historiography, and even today they have hardly been accommodated within the “Western”
public consciousness.70 Whilst there was established clear legal and philosophical bases for
condemnation of the Nazi crimes, the criminal prosecution of communist offenders was
mostly an individual prerogative of the former states-victims (post-communist republics)
themselves. 71
Europe is still divided in terms of political, moral, and legal evaluation of the Soviet
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heritage. In the light of all these arguments, the claims of Diner that the Holocaust pretends
to become the foundational event for European collective memory and World War II – the
foundational event in a Uniting Europe, remains highly questionable. 72 How could we refer
to these two concepts as foundational events, if their interpretation and remembrance is so
divergent across European countries? How could the War be a foundational event if it led to
the foreign occupation of a half of the European countries?

One of the factors that explains existing asymmetry in Western reflection and
investigation of the communist crimes is the “Iron Curtain” that divided East and West.
Add to this a powerful Soviet propaganda machine and extremely little knowledge of
Western Europeans about the real situation in occupied Eastern Europe. Evans points out,
that Western historians were too compliant to the Soviet propaganda; they could not realize
the full scale of the communist crimes. The myths and misunderstanding created by the
communist propaganda had a profound influence on their interpretation of the history of
Central and Eastern European states. The Western public was too attached to the existing
scenario of World War II and the subsequent success of European integration to consider its
rethinking. Western Europeans wished to “draw a line” under the legacy of World War II,
and their experience with the Nazi Germany and Hitler by the Nuremberg trial. 73 When the
process of European unification started, they put great emphasis on cooperation and
integration, rather than on digging up the past. At the same time, the construction of the
socialist society was progressing in the Eastern bloc. Therefore, European borders,
identities and also memories were frozen by East/West division and the “desire, common to
both sides, to forget the recent past and forge a new continent.”74
Furthermore, as the Western European countries actually never fought against the
Soviet Union and the Red Army, Stalin could never compete in the popular mind with
Hitler as the “evil enemy.”75 Mälksoo adds one more supposition causing inequality in the
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remembering and research of the Nazi and the Soviet regimes’ criminal records – there has
never been a Soviet Nuremberg trial; therefore, documentation of the crimes of Nazism is
much broader and well-known in comparison to the communists’.”76 Also, Russia, the
Soviets’ successor state, is interested in the Soviet heroization, maintaining an image of
World War II as the Great Patriotic War and the Red Army as a liberator of oppressed
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, any attempts to clarify this part of
history are usually met with counter-defense from Russia’s side.

The next part of the chapter gives overview to the formation of Estonia’s national
memory, history and identity. It defines the main aspects that shape Estonians’ memory and
marks down the key agents that have influenced national memory and identity construction
– Negative and Positive external Others of Estonia.

2.2.1 Formation of Estonia’s National Memory and History Narrative

The pre-World War II history of Estonia can be symbolically divided into three
stages: “ancient freedom,” “700-year night of slavery” and “independence.”77 The period of
“ancient freedom” ended in the thirteenth century when the territory of Estonia was
conquered, first, by Danes and Germans, then by Swedes, and at last, by Russians. The
Estonian Liberation War (or the War of Independence) 1918-1920 and the birth of Estonian
Republic on 24 February 1918 terminated the seven centuries long era of foreign
oppression. An interesting paradox – though the War was fought against the Bolshevik Red
Army, the prominent moment was the battle against the German Landeswehr near Võnnu in
the summer 1919 that Estonians won. During the pre-war period, Germans were perceived
as negative significant Other for Estonians, “conquerors and exploiters of the Estonian
peasantry.”78 Vahur Made goes even further, presenting the whole “700-year night of
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slavery” as equal to the Baltic Germans’ dominance in Estonia. 79 It explains the
significance of the battle near Võnnu for Estonians. Final victory gained after successive
phases of losing and gaining liberty became a powerful symbol of freedom and
independence, and also a central element of Estonia’s national memory and history
narrative.80 The narrative presents a short period of independence as a success story of the
Estonian nation and its only natural form of existence. 81
Estonia became an independent state after World War I, in 1918 and preserved this
status during the interwar period. World War II put an end to the twenty years long period
of its independent statehood. According to the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact and its secret
protocols concluded between Stalin and Hitler, Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet
Union in 1940. The next year the country was invaded by Nazi Germany and then again
recaptured by the Red Army and forcibly reincorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in 1944. The Estonia’s national narrative presents Soviet occupation as an era of
aberration, “discontinuity,” “an abnormal state of affairs,” the age of repressions and
exploitation of Estonians.82 The Soviet period has an important role in the identity
formation of Estonian people and the state itself. Kirsti Jõesalu divides the Soviet time into
two main phases: High Totalitarianism/Stalinism and Normalization/Post-Stalinism. 83 In
memory studies, the former is related to the experience of cultural trauma (in that period,
two main deportations of 1941 and 1949, and also mass arrests and repressions took place).
Attitude towards the latter is more ambivalent.
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2.2.2 Russia (the Soviet Union) as a Significant Negative Other for Estonia
Russia has always been a significant Other for Estonia. However, if during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Estonians’ perception of their large eastern
neighbour was neither positive nor negative84, since the 1940s onwards widespread
opposition to Soviet regime has placed Russians as the most significant negative Other for
Estonia.85 As Petersoo claims, “negative othering of Russia is almost inevitable” after fifty
years of Soviet domination; it is and will further assert influence of Estonia’s foreign policy
towards Russia.86 Made adds that relations between the two countries remain “dogged by
controversies over politics, culture, security, history and mentality,” although there is
seemingly some “softening” of tensions nowadays.87 Petersoo distinguishes between
Russians’ external and internal otherness in case of Estonia. The former is about Russia as a
state; the latter refers to the Russian-speaking minority living in Estonia. A great number of
Russian Estonians are/were World War II immigrants and their descendants. Internal
othering of Russians was especially widespread in the immediate period after the
restoration of Estonia’s independence. As Petersoo claims, the Russian-speaking minority
“functioned as the internal negative Others against whom Estonians asserted their
nationness.”88
The Soviet past had various meanings in public and private.89 For the most part, it is
explained by the existence of two parallel history narratives in Estonia – the official Soviet
one and unofficial national. The former was a sort of artificial creation for Estonians;
externally imposed by the communist authorities and widely dispersed in public sphere, it
aimed to construct the Soviet Estonian identity and replace Estonian national narrative by
the Soviet one. However, Estonian national narrative remained untouched in the collective
memory of Estonians; it was maintained and transmitted through the families (the private
84
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sphere). Pääbo claims that unofficial history counternarrative enabled Estonians to restore
their independent national memory. 90 Tamm supports that argument. Referring to the late
1980s and early 1990s, he argues that “an active reconstruction of pre-war historical
memory took place” in parallel with the restoration of an independent statehood of
Estonia.91 As Jõesalu adds, together with the reconstruction of pre-war historical memory,
Estonian memory work was focused also on the traumatic events of the 1940s–1950s. 92
Experiences of that severe period were involved in the formation of the dominant narrative
in Estonian society in the beginning of 1990s. For the great part, the narrative of that
transitional post-communist stage was build on the principle of legal continuity with the
pre-war republic and was aimed on the establishment of that continuity and international
recognition of newly independent Estonia. The brief period of independence 1918-1940
had not only high symbolic significance; also, it enabled Estonian political elite to regard
the country as a restored state, not a successor state of the USSR.

2.2.3 Europe as a Significant Positive Other for Estonia

Similarly to the role of negative Other, the positive Other’s influence on the identity
and memory formation of a nation is considerable as well. The positive Other usually
performs as a source of admiration, as a model or standard towards which the nation
aspires. The most significant positive Other for Estonia has always been Finland. During
the age on national awakening93, the architects of Estonian nationalism had been “primarily
oriented towards Finland,” regarding the latter as an example to follow. 94 There are a
number of factors explaining closeness of two countries. The most important is their
90
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linguistic and cultural proximity. Estonian and Finnish belong to the same group of FinnoUgric languages; Estonia and Finland have a number of common traditions and national
holidays; the Estonian national epic Kalevipoeg is based on a plot of the Finnish epic
Kalevala.95 Marju Lauristin argued that in the Soviet time, the Finnish significant Other
helped Estonia to “maintain an inner distance from the Soviet-Russian, i.e., Byzantine
forms of everyday practices during the five decades of occupation.”96 Besides that, Estonia
and Finland are also close geographically – the distance between the Estonian capital
Tallinn and the Finnish capital Helsinki is 85 kilometers (53 miles) by sea.

Europe has been a significant external Other for Estonia for many centuries already.
Despite the fact that relations between Estonia and Europe started to develop through
establishment of foreign rule on Estonian territory by Danes, Germans and Swedes (since
thirteenth until eighteenth century), in Estonian collective memory those times have good
associations. Stories of a mythical “Good Old Swedish Time,” that are still widespread in
Estonian society, are a good confirmation to it. According to Petersoo, Swedish cultural
heritage is regarded as a constituent part of Estonian identity till nowadays.97 Though
Germans initially had a status of the negative Other for Estonians, in twentieth century this
perception changed in the opposite direction. When the Baltic Germans left Estonia in the
beginning of World War II and were not regarded anymore as a threat to the Estonian
nation and Estonian culture, their image was reconsidered and became positive. Estonia
could not underestimate the contributions the Baltic German nobility made to the nation,
such as development of agriculture and education as well as introduction of the Lutheran
Protestantism which played an important role in further development of a written Estonian
language. 98 Today, Germans are one of the positive external Others for Estonia; German
inheritance is valorized in the society.
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Thus, the long history of foreign rule actually contributed to development of
“Europeaness” of Estonia. Estonians have emphasized their belonging to Europe and the
Western cultural space by various traditions and practices the former oppressor brought to
them, such the “legal and educational systems, developed through the centuries according
to Swedish and German traditions.”99 In addition, Estonia took part in the shaping of
European civilization – being actively involved in the Protestant Reformation, and later in
the process of nation-building. In the nineteenth – twentieth century, there was an attempt
to conceptualize Estonian culture as part of European culture made by a neo-romantic
literary movement “Young Estonia” (Noor Eesti). The main slogan of the group stated:
“More culture! More European culture! Let us remain Estonians, but let us become
Europeans too. We want to discover the ideas and forms towards which we are impelled by
our national spirit, character, and needs on the one hand, and by European culture on the
other.”100 Taking into consideration abovementioned factors, it becomes clear why Estonia
feels to be a genuine part of European culture and civilization, seeing Europe as its “natural
home.”101

However, since the Enlightenment, there has been a tendency in Western Europe to
regard Estonia as “Europe but not quite Europe.”102 Two centuries of subordination to the
Russian Empire (1721-1918) as well as recent history of the Soviet rule (1944-1991)
played an important role in the distortion of Estonia’s “European” image. Since the 1980s
Estonia attempted to restore the lost during the years of the Soviet domination ties with its
positive Other – Europe. This course of rapprochement with Europe and the Western World
has been widely known under the name of “Returning to Europe.”103 In the subsequent
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years, the “Return to Europe” narrative became central to Estonian political and cultural
discourse. According to Lauristin, Estonia’s desire to be “accepted again by the West and to
be recognised as an integral part of the Western cultural realms” was even stronger
motivator for Estonians than “mere economic or political motivation could ever be.”104

The next part of the chapter explains the meaning of the term “Returning to Europe”
as well as describes its significance for Estonia. In this part, I demonstrate how European
aspirations of Estonia and the historical legacies of its Soviet past are interconnected. Also,
I show the positive and negative sides of Soviet experience on post-communist transitional
period in Estonia.

2.3.1 Estonia’s “Returning to Europe”
For Estonia, the Soviet era represented “false history” and a state of abnormality.105
The period of existence under the Soviet regime and association of Estonia with its Soviet
past also after the restoration of independence (expressed in widespread international
labeling of Estonia as a post-Soviet Republic) distorted the perception of Estonia as a
European country, as a part of a “true” Europe. Thus, the “Return to Europe” symbolized a
transformation of Estonia from “false” into “normal”, “full,” “genuine” European state.106

The meaning of the concept “Return to Europe” has been changing during the
whole period of post-communist transition. In the beginning stages, Estonia used it as a
legitimating force and an appeal towards international community to recognize its
independence. The discourse “Return to Europe” provided an opportunity to restore
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damaged economic and diplomatic relations with the West. The Estonian political elite used
the term also as a tool of domestic and foreign politics. The slogan “Return to Europe” was
used as a counter measure against previously dominant communist parties in national
election campaigns that were held right after restoration of independence. Europe was a
symbol of peace, capitalist (market) economy and democracy – concepts which did not
evoke associations with the Soviet regime. The concept “Return to Europe” was very
symbolic; it indicated willingness of Estonia towards democratic values and standards,
associated with Europe and pre-Soviet history of the country. In later phases of postcommunist transition, the term performed as a driving force to join the European Union.

2.3.2 “Return to Europe” or From “One Union to Another Union”?

However, the memories of the Soviet period were too fresh and painful yet. In
Estonia, as well as in other former communist bloc republics, a possibility of joining the
EU was perceived with alert. Potential membership was regarded as a continuation of the
Soviet period, as a perspective of going from “one union to another union” and fulfilling
the commands from Moscow before and from Brussels now.107 Quite often, critics of the
European integration created parallels between the EU and the Soviet Union, insisting on
obvious similarities between those two: the bureaucratic nature, the necessity to
subordinate part of the national autonomy to the supranational body, ineffective economic
systems. Dissatisfaction with the economic system of the EU was expressed in statements
like “going from the free market to central planning” or “from socialism to socialism.” In
the case of Estonia and the Czech Republic these arguments were especially meaningful.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states rapidly and successfully transformed
their socialist economic systems into free market economies. Restrictions that would follow
membership in the EU were perceived as a danger to effective functioning of the new
economic systems. 108
The main fear, though, was related to the loss of national identity. For countries that
107

Mikkel and Kasekamp, 296.
Membership in the EU is accompanied with a number of regulations that are imposed on every candidate
country to adjust its domestic system with the EU norms.
108

35

just restored their independence, it was difficult to surrender a part of their freedom again.
For Estonia and two other Baltic States, Latvia and Lithuania, this question was of
particular importance. In contrast to other communist-dominated countries from Central
and Eastern Europe which were members of the Warsaw Treaty and formally preserved
their independence with relative autonomy in the decision-making process, three Baltic
States were officially incorporated into the Soviet Union and fully subordinated to unionwide established rules and norms. This factor has a strong effect on mentality, moral
perception of external dominance and attitude towards national identity also after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Psychologically, it was more difficult for the Baltic States
to devote a part of their recently regained sovereignty to the EU.109

2.3.3 Historical Legacies and Memory Framing Estonia’s “Return to Europe”

Membership in the EU required adjustment of domestic legislation with the EU’s
standards. One of the most disputed and negotiated areas in case of Estonia were laws
related to preservation of national identity of the republic – citizenship and language
legislation. One of the legacies of the Soviet period that distinguishes Estonia (and Latvia)
from other former communist republics is a large Russian minority. According to recent
data, Estonia consists of 68.7 per cent of Estonians and 25.6 per cent of Russians.110 This
demographic composition is a consequence of Soviet-style industrialization, russification
(under the guise of “sovietization”) and resettlement policies of the Soviet Union. 111 The
main goal of these policies was establishment of the Russian dominance in non-Russian
communities and amalgamation of citizens of all Soviet Union republics in order to create a
unique Soviet nation and identity. As a result, the number of ethnic Estonians in the
country decreased by one third during the forty-six years of the Soviet regime. If by the end
of World War II more than 90 per cent of population was ethnic Estonian, then by the end
109
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of the Soviet rule the proportion was 61.5 per cent of Estonians against 38.5 per cent of
representatives of other nationalities (mostly Russians, but also Ukrainians, Belarusians and
natives of other Soviet republics). Soviet efforts directed on reducing the number of
Estonians to minority in their homeland as well as relegation of their language and culture
to a “second-class status” had a long-lasting psychological impact on Estonians. After the
restoration of independence the question of preserving national identity together with other
attributes of the statehood (citizenship, language, culture, traditions) was very important
and vulnerable issue for Estonians. In 1992, Estonia adopted a Law on Citizenship that
made a process of obtaining Estonian citizenship very demanding for non-Estonian
inhabitants. Automatic citizenship was granted only to people who were citizens of the prewar Estonia, and their descendants. Estonia justified such decision by the principle of legal
continuity with the First Republic. According to the international observers’ position,
Estonian citizenship law corresponded to international standards and did not violate any
norms.112 However, Russian authorities accused Estonia in adopting discriminatory laws
that violated the human rights of the non-Estonian population. The EU and OSCE also
expressed criticism, and pressured Estonia to adapt less restrictive legislation and to
accommodate the Russian-speaking minority in the country. Such reaction of the
international community to Russia’s claims made Estonia suspicious of the West and
intensified its fears of losing national identity within the EU.113

A popular perception of Estonia as a (post)-Soviet country is another inheritance of
the Soviet past that played an important role in Estonia’s European debate. Even nowadays
it is still common to hear about Estonia as a former Soviet country or a post-communist
country, despite the fact that Estonia is a member of the EU. A number of factors
contributed to this image: the fifty years-long communist past, relatively unknown preSoviet history, the short period of independence, the small size (45 228 sq km) and a
geographic location of the country. The last factor is important for two reasons. Estonia’s
location on the periphery of Europe combined with its proximity and a direct border with
112
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the Russian Federation could explain why Estonia is sometimes mistakenly considered to
be a part of Russia. A large ethnic minority (both Russian-speaking citizens and noncitizens) supplements this misleading image. All these factors taken together explain
Estonia’s attempts to protect its statehood. Quite often, Estonia is accused because of its
nationalist tendencies, of national chauvinism. In fact, the Estonian political elite used
nationalism as a protection from external influences, especially in the immediate time after
restoring independence. During the post-communist transition, appeals to preserve national
identity have been always in the heart of Estonia domestic and foreign policy discourse.
The EU’s membership provided a new framework for them.

Regional identity is an additional factor that has played role in the Estonia’s
discourse on European integration. Estonia is often referred as a “Baltic country”. Despite
the wide usage and seeming unambiguity of that term, in fact it is rather problematic from
the historical perspective.
The Baltic in a broad sense means that a country has an access to the Baltic Sea.
There are nine states that surround the Baltic Sea and share a common coastline (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia). However, the
term Baltic is more known as a collective name for three countries – Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania. The concept was developed after the World War I when these states first gained
their independence (1918) and emerged from the ruins of the Russian Empire. 114 The first
references to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as Baltic belong to the Russian Czar Alexander
III who gave the countries a status of the Baltic provinces (Прибалтийские губернии) and
included them into the Baltic region (Прибалтийский край).
After World War I the term Baltic used to be the main identification of the regional
identity of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It has both negative and positive connotations.
With relation to two powerful neighbours of the Baltic States – Russia and Germany – the
term reflected the smallness and marginality of the Baltic countries as opposite to the
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strengths and significance of their big neighbours.115 Also, the concept Baltic is sometimes
associated with the process of easternization.116 In the Soviet times, the term “Baltic”
distinguished three republics from the Soviet Union on the basis of their exceptionality:
relatively high living standard, good economic indicators, willingness to be different and
preserve national identity. Not without reason other Soviet nations later regarded Estonia as
the “Soviet West;”117 the Estonian SSR together with two other republics of the Soviet
Pribaltika118 were seen as a Westernized enclave within the Soviet Union, that in addition,
had privileged access to an “electronic window to the West” – the Finnish television
broadcasts.119 Thus, in the Soviet period, the term Baltic has definitely positive meaning for
the Balts themselves.
However, for the West the Baltic meant nothing until the late 1980s; Estonians,
Latvians and Lithuanians became known during the “Singing Revolution,” a sequence of
events that led to independence of three Baltic States in August 1991. Mass demonstrations
and protests in different forms showed efforts and desire of people for freedom. Estonians
became famous for singing patriotic national songs forbidden by the Soviet regime.
Another manifestation of discontent was the Baltic Way – a peaceful demonstration that
marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, by which Hitler and Stalin
divided Europe into the spheres of influence.120 The Baltic Way was a very powerful and
symbolic statement against the Soviet regime. It was a joint effort of three Baltic States that
showed their common wish, unity, solidarity and a real aspiration for freedom.
Several years after the restoration of independence, the term Baltic lost its initial
meaning in Estonia. By the late 1990s, it was rarely used in public, and was even taken to
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represent something shameful. 121 The ties between the Baltic States became looser. Estonia
reoriented itself towards the Scandinavian (Nordic) countries, Sweden and Finland. The
Estonian political elite always emphasized strong ties with those countries, claiming that
“Estonia maintains its Nordic characteristics as its inheritance” and stressing Estonian
people psychological attachment and Nordic mentality: “we Estonians have always felt that
we belong to the Nordic world.”122 Partly, attempts to place Estonia closer to Scandinavian
countries was a natural move – Finland and Sweden have always been the biggest trade
partners of Estonia and economic cooperation with these countries in fact only intensified
with time. On the other hand, such drastic reorientation was a deliberate effort of the
Estonian political elite to detach Estonia from the Baltic region and attach it to the Nordic.
Another obvious case demonstrating Estonia’s attempt to distance itself from the Baltic
States appeared in the negotiation process to join the EU. The next chapter provides
detailed overview and explanation to this phenomenon.
The current chapter demonstrated the divergence of Estonia’s national memory in
the context of European collective memory. The main cause for that is the recent history of
existence under the communist rule that distinguish Estonia from its Western-European
counterparts. The chapter showed the influence the Soviet experience asserted on the
process of European integration of Estonia. Information presented in this chapter provides a
necessary context for better understanding of the main research idea of the study and allows
to proceed with the analysis.
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CHAPTER 3: REFLECTION OF MEMORY IN POLITICS

In the current chapter I demonstrate how the Estonian political elite has built and
framed the discourse of European integration in Estonia during the different stages of postcommunist transition. The chapter reveals the link that exists between memory and politics.
Based on theoretical assumptions discussed in the previous chapters, the analysis of the
speeches delivered by the leading political representatives of Estonia shows how memory
may perform as a “symbolic” and “structural” power. Also, the chapter demonstrates how
the legacies of the past are intertwined with the present and which role the past experiences
might play in shaping the political discourse of a country. Especially, in case of Central and
Eastern Europe, “where the past is ever present.”123

The transitional period is divided into four stages: “de-Sovietization,” “application,”
“negotiation” and “membership.” The first stage, “De-Sovietization”, started on 20th of
August 1991 (restoration of Estonia’s independence) and lasted until 31st August 1994
(withdrawal of the Russian troops from Estonia’s territory). Second period, “application”,
followed “De-Sovietization” and finished on 1 st of February 1998 (when the association
agreement to accede the EU entered into force). Third stage, “negotiation” continued until
1st of May 2004 (when Estonia joined the EU). Last one, “membership” is currently
ongoing.

Stage I: De-Sovietization
The era of de-Sovietization started when Estonia restored its independence on 20th
of August 1991. The state was especially vulnerable during this period. Estonia was afraid
of the Russian Federation, a successor state of the Soviet Union, and its potential attempts
to encroach upon freshly regained freedom. The President of the Republic, Lennart Meri,
warned the Estonian people and the international community against “new, aggressive
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conception of foreign policy [of the Russian Federation], oriented to neo-colonialism.”124
Referring to one Russian journal, Meri claimed that Russia had adopted an active postimperialist policy, and Estonia and Latvia would be its first victims. These fears were
intensified by the presence of the Russian troops on Estonian soil. A statement that
“security [is] to be our foreign policy Priority Number One” defined that period.125
The majority of the political speeches delivered during the de-Sovietization period
were directed towards achieving faster international recognition of Estonia’s independence
and protection from a potential counter reaction of the former oppressor. The main strategy
Estonia used to present itself was victimization. Constantly stressing the illegality of the
Soviet occupation, unwillingness of the Russian Federation to negotiate in the questions of
common borders and troops withdrawal, the inability of Estonia to influence the situation
because of its small size, Estonia tried to draw international attention and receive protection
and support for the endangered country, one of “the smallest states of Europe.”126 Estonia
was constantly sending messages to the Western world to influence Russia to withdraw its
troops from its territory as fast as possible. By those appeals Estonia stressed the necessity
of international resolution of the situation, and also emphasized its vulnerability vis-à-vis
Russia: “of course, this [troop withdrawal] can only take place with the support of the
international community.”127
Another source of worries was Russia’s emerging concept of the “Near Abroad.”128
Estonia preferred to see itself as the “near abroad” of the European Union and all its
members states, not of Moscow.129 Appealing to the democratic principles as the foundation
of Western countries, and their “willing obligation” to stand by these principles, Estonia
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attempted to secure support and protection of Western world.

Already in the late 1980s the Baltic States were associated with emerging
democratic traditions and programs. In the early 1990s, this tendency was intensified. The
president’s speeches abounded in statements like “the first democratic elections held in
Estonia since the second World War,” “Estonia is a state ruled by law”, “the first
democratically-elected constitutional government in Estonia since World War Two.”130
First, it was an appeal to show a legal continuity with the First Republic 1918-1940 that
was unlawfully annexed by the Soviet Union. Second, such statements were made in order
to contrast democratic aspirations of Estonia to the undemocratic former Soviet Union (at
that time, already synonymous with the Russian Federation). Estonia was on a way of
constructing and reaffirming its new identity; focusing of own positive Self, Estonia
emphasized the negative “otherness” of the Soviet Union even more and tried to distance
from the Soviet past as fast as possible. The political elite always emphasized Estonia’s
willingness to become a state with a functioning democracy as opposed to the former
communist rule. Constantly claiming that Estonia was a state ruled by law that respects
democracy and human rights, politicians highlighted Estonia’s Western and European
credentials. Also, Estonia tried to represent itself as a medium that had brought the
forbidden ideas of democracy and the parliamentary tradition from Europe to the Soviet
Union. Drawing parallels between own small size and enormous harm to “the colonial
state” that Estonia, “eyesore to the empire-minded Russia”, had caused, the political elite
accentuated the contribution of Estonia in infecting the Russian state apparatus. The
president strengthened his arguments by using metaphors, comparing the influence of
democratic ideas and practices on Russia with plague “dreaded in the middle ages.131
During the first decade after restoring independence, the references to the legal
continuity of the First Republic served as a prerequisite of Estonia’s demands for
international protection and recognition. The principle of legal continuity was a dominant
element in Estonia’s de-Sovietization discourse. Introduction to the speeches featured
130

Lennart Meri, Speech at the Reception for the Members of the Finnish Foreign Ministry and the Corps
Diplomatique. Helsinki [Finland]: 9 October 1992.
131
Meri, Tallinn, 16 December 1993.

43

concepts like “the War of Liberation” and “the Peace Treaty of Tartu” provided legitimacy
to the arguments.132 The principle of “legal continuity” was presented as a bridge over the
Soviet times to the interwar republic; this connection was supposed to turn everything in
between into something illegal and foreign.133
One of the most obvious signs and attempts to break with the past and distance
Estonia from its long Russian/Soviet experience was the radical shift of cadres in the
government. Prime Minister Mart Laar (1992-1994) “cleaned the house” by replacing the
old Soviet administration with a new generation, young people in their twenties and
thirties, who “were not spoiled by the soviet past.”134 It was an attempt to change the
infamous Soviet system characterized by nepotism and political manipulations. Such rapid
overturn of cadres demonstrated the willingness of Estonia to break away with the Soviet
past by adopting new practices and get rid of the Soviet mentality directing behaviour of
former elites. 135
The best way to break away with the communist identity was to replace it with a
new one. Though appeals to national identity as a cornerstone of Estonia’s statehood were
especially sound and frequent that time, Estonia was clearly aware of necessity to ensure
some additional source of identity, whether European, or Western, or Nordic. During the
de-Sovietization phase, Europe or the European Union were not seen as a single and
definite goal, a primary aim. Estonia’s main intention was rather to show its “nonbelonging” to the former Soviet Union through attachment to whatever international
organization or communities. It was a way to “overcome the burdens of the past”, “the
decades of darkness.”136 The regional Baltic identity was also emphasized and positively
valued. First, the Baltic identity represented the image of common interests, unity and
stability that the Balts had showed recently in their collective attempts to liberate from the
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Soviet rule. Access to the Baltic Sea allowed Estonians to relate themselves not only with
other countries surrounding it, but also with all of Europe through that connection. The
region Estonia belonged to was promoted as having “an exciting potential to become the
next dynamic growth zone of an integrating Europe, in the new Europe of regions.”137
Security considerations that have always been and will remain in the core of
Estonia’s political discourse were first steps towards the emergence and clarification of the
EU discourse. Formation of the collective European identity in Estonia’s case started with
the creation of “a new European Defence Identity.”138 It presented an opportunity to
become integrated into the “New” Europe, as opposed to the “False” Europe – Estonia’s
existence under the Soviet regime. Europe was a symbol of the future, of freedom, of hope,
of a better life. The Estonian people’s future was a “free Europe, a part and member of
which we [Estonians] had been for the past eight centuries.”139 The emphasis on Estonia’s
historical ties with Europe has always been an element of political discourse in the postcommunist transitional period.

The era of de-Sovietization lasted until the final withdrawal of remaining
Russian troops from Estonia’s soil on 31st August 1994. During this period, Estonia’s
political discourse was dominated by security fears and search for protection from every
possible source. Therefore, the debate was not so much European, but rather international;
more a “return to the Western World” than “return to Europe”. It had nothing to do with the
EU as such. The main goal at that time was to get an access to the main international
organizations: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN),
Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and
the European Union just as one element of that list. Membership in those organizations was
seen as a confirmation of Estonia’s “European-ness” and an appeal to recognize the
illegality of the Soviet occupation as an “artificial” imposition, violation of Estonian
national identity, culture, and traditions. 140 The primary Estonia’s strategy was to present
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itself as a victim of the communist regime and to prove that the country had a full right to
be a member of Western community. The discourse of “returning to Europe” was based on
the master narrative of the Estonian nation and the principle of legal continuity with the
First Republic. Estonia used the discourse “return to Europe” as a primary tool to protect
and distance itself from the Russian Federation and marginalize the burden of the Soviet
past, and also as an appeal to revive the country from the fifty years-long period of
international isolation and strengthen its place in the “true” Europe.141 During the period of
de-Sovietization, Estonia tried to rebuild its identity and present itself as an antipode to the
negative Russian (Soviet) Other and in the light of Positive European (Western) Other.

Stage II: Application

The “application” stage refers to the period of time between submitting an official
request to become a member of the EU (24th of November 1995) and entering into force of
the Europe Agreement (1st of February 1998).142 The Europe Agreement, along with the
Free trade agreement, created an umbrella for Estonia’s preparations for the EU’s
membership. 143 They established a framework for EU – Estonian relations providing a basis
for regular discussions on specific issues, high-level meetings of senior officials, and
implementing the pre-accession assistance. 144 In order to adapt the periodization of the
post-communist transition to the particular Estonia’s case, I will shift the beginning of the
“application” period from November 1995 to August 1994. It will help to avoid gaps in the
analysis. August 1994, or to be precise, 31st of August 1994 was an important date for
Estonia, since that day indicated the final withdrawal of the Russian troops from its
territory and indicated the beginning of a new period.
31st of August 1994 was one of the turning points in Estonia’s history and foreign
policy. It gave a clearer outline for Estonia’s discourse on European integration as well.
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Another important factor was the accession of Finland and Sweden into the EU on 1st of
January 1995. 145 It was no coincidence that Estonia applied for the EU membership later
that year. 146 The third reason that caused more active and definite position with regards to
the EU membership was a statement by Estonia’s foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves,
who recognized that Estonia probably would not be included into the first round of NATO
enlargement. Ilves’ prediction encouraged Estonia to focus on obtaining EU
membership. 147 The security threat was still dominant element of Estonia foreign policy
consideration. If there would not be “hard” security that NATO could provide, Estonia
definitely needed some kind of security, and EU’s “soft” security option seemed to be the
best alternative.
In general, there was an obvious shift in rhetoric of the Estonian political elite right
after the 31st of August 1994. Estonia did not stress so much its status of victim as it was
during the stage of de-Sovietization.

There was much more confidence, clarity, and

determination. Estonia still perceived a security threat from the side of its eastern
neighbour. However, instead of mere appeals to international community for protection,
there were developed different frameworks for managing security options. Two weeks after
the withdrawal of the Russian troops, Jüri Luik, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia,
came up with the main principles of Estonia’s foreign policy and presented them as a
mathematical equation: Security = Normalization + Integration. 148 Normalization referred
to the Estonia’s relations with the Russian Federation, integration – with trans-Atlantic
community, and security united all elements of the equation. The president of the Republic,
Lennart Meri presented the same approach, but from the different perspective. He resorted
to geometry, and defined security space of Estonia as a “Strategic Quadrangle,” that
consisted of lines drawn between and among Tallinn, Brussels, Washington and Moscow.149
The keywords of that approach were the same as in case with Luik’s equation: security,
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normalization and integration. Again, security was the primary element; security depended
largely on the actions of all actors of the “Strategic Quadrangle.”
In general, the “application” period was characterized by increased enthusiasm
towards the Russian Federation: “Right now, both we and Russia enjoy an historic
opportunity to improve relations.” There was even a special approach towards Russia called
a policy of Positive Engagement, whose key (operative) word was “mutual”: mutual
respect for sovereignty, mutual respect for national security interests, mutual refraining
from verbal and other confrontations, mutual respect for international norms of behaviour,
most importantly, in the area of human rights.”150 Introducing those ideas, Estonia still
relied on the principle of legal continuity: the main element behind the policy of Positive
Engagement was the Tartu Treaty. Estonia appealed to the common duty of Estonia and
Russia to “make that peace again.” In the beginning, Estonia saw the Treaty as the only
valid basis for a border agreement. However, in the context of the policy of “pacification
with the East,” Estonia declared its readiness to soften insistence on Tartu Treaty as the
only option. According to Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the minister of foreign affairs of Estonia,
such a decision was “not merely necessary for the demarcation of Estonia, (but) also the
first step showing that Estonia is a responsible nation with a European-like behaviour.”151
By this statement, Ilves not only reflected willingness of Estonia to overcome a very
important element of the Soviet legacy. Stress on the European-like behaviour reaffirmed
the new positive European identity of Estonia in the light of negative Russian Other,
presented as a rigid, incompliant, uncooperative, undemocratic state.
Another manifestation of reorientation to Europe was expressed in the rapid change
of trade partners. According to Meri, in 1991, the whole industry of Estonia (95 percent)
was conducted with “what is now called the former soviet union or FSU”, whereas in four
years after restoring independence, the proportion changed considerably – 65 per cent of
trade was now with Western European countries. Pointing out that for the most part, these
Western European countries were Finland and Sweden, the president emphasized the
historical and cultural ties between Estonia, Finland and Sweden, referring to these states as
150
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“the Former Swedish Empire, or FSE.”152 Meri gave positive value to Estonia’s existence
under the Swedish occupation, and presented it as a good experience. This experience
changed the mentality of Estonians, and as a result, was one of the main factors that
determined Estonia’s success as an independent state: “Our culture heritage is one of a
West-finnic substrate overlayed with a strong vineer of Germanic and Swedish
Lutheranism. It is finnic individualism tempered by 800 years of the German legal system.
It is finnic stubbornness transformed by the same Swedish tradition of hard, dogged work...
In a word, one reason we are successful is that we are Scandinavians.”153 Immediately after
the remarks that admired Swedish occupation, the president moved to the “cruel truth” of
the Soviet experience. Such immediate contraposition of positive external Other Sweden
against negative external Other Soviet Union, the association of Swedish rule with success
and the Soviet one with the loss of freedom, strengthened the negative image of the Soviet
experience even more.
An interesting tendency, in the light of communist experience the former negative
Other Germany was transformed into positive Other. From the nineteenth century (the era
of “national awakening”) and until the post-war Soviet occupation, the rule of the Baltic
Germans was mostly referred as a period of darkness, a synonym for the colonial
oppression and enslavement of the indigenous “Estonian” peasantry. 154 Now the period of
“700-year night of slavery” was seen through the lens of legal heritage: “Estonia has been
part of the Roman-Germanic legal system for over 700 years…This legal basis is a nursery
where everything else springs up; it is the prerequisite, the basis and the very guarantor of
the survival, the development and the success of our modern state… When we think why
perestroika took such a direction, and was not a tragic collapse or a civil war – the legal
system has shaped also the Estonian way of thinking.”155 Now the Soviet Union took over
the evil image of colonial state; some statements by the president of Estonia, Lennart Meri,
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were clear confirmations of it. 156 The Soviet Union, and its current successor, the Russian
Federation, replaced Germany as a dominant negative Other in Estonia’s master narrative,
national consciousness and identity construction. 157

Besides a tendency to present the Soviet time as an era of aberration, and appeal
through it to the necessity of recognition of Estonia as a part of Europe, the political elite
often presented the Soviet past as a symbol of strength, as an experience that made
Estonian people more mature, realistic, wiser, stronger. Estonia has experienced life under
communism – nothing could be worst. In this context, Estonia’s smallness turned into its
strength, it was a prerequisite of unity. A small nation with a huge desire for freedom and
readiness to unite and fight to the last: “Estonia’s strength is our common sense, our
aptitude for learning and our will to act. That Estonia is exactly where it is. That it is just as
large as it is. Estonia’s small size can be an asset. Even our underwater diving record - fifty
years in the murky depths of Soviet occupation, arriving ashore gasping for breath, with
liberty, equality and fraternity still clenched between our teeth – is an asset.”158 On this
stage, Estonia felt itself more confident than during the de-Sovietization period; the Soviet
experience gave this country and its nation such a lesson that Estonia felt itself obliged not
only to talk about its historical experience in order “to avoid its recurrence in the rest of
Europe,”159 but also to “teach Europe” which, unlike Estonia, have been living in illusions
during the Cold War era.160

In general, during the term in office of the President Meri, Estonia’s dominant
strategy in the phase of “application” might be called as “The Little Country That
Could.”161 By that, the president meant the success of Estonia in rapid implementation and
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functioning of political and economic reforms in the country that had liberated itself from
the rule of foreign oppressor just four years ago. In this period, the self-praising of Estonia
by its political elite was common. In order to prove its qualification for membership in the
EU, Estonia’s politicians constantly quoted different sources that marked Estonia’s success:
“our economic reform program hailed by the IMF and the World Bank as among the most
successful in Central Europe. It is no wonder that some observers refer to Estonia as a
modern Wirtschaftswunder.”162 The decision of the EU to begin accession negotiations with
Estonia only reinforced and confirmed its own belief that it is a “Little Country That
Could”: could make a rapid transition from the Soviet system towards free market economy
and democracy, could achieve the best indicators among the former Soviet bloc countries,
could become a member of the EU too. This feeling was supported by the fact that Estonia
was the only post-Soviet state (among officially incorporated into the USSR republics) that
was accepted to begin negotiations to join the EU. The two other Baltic States, Latvia and
Lithuania, were not.163 At that time, Estonia’s tendency to distance itself from two other
Baltic States became especially evident. The only “Balt” accepted for negotiations, Estonia
wanted to show its individuality, exceptionality, successfulness. 164 It was proud of itself and
accepted major responsibility at the same time: a tiny and relatively unknown country
located on the periphery of Europe that was accepted to be a candidate of the first wave of
eastern enlargement. Estonia had to prove its worthiness and eligibility to be placed in the
same line with Central and Eastern European states, not burdened by the status of a former
Soviet Union republic. Estonia’s Baltic identity did not seem to be a benefit any more. It
undermined its new international image, and represented continuity with the Soviet past. In
light of this, Estonia’s attempts to marginalize its Baltic regional identity and its
“separatist” tendencies looked quite justified. Estonia wished the Baltic States to be
regarded individually, not as three interconnected countries as it was used in the Soviet and
early post-Soviet period. An Estonian foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, portrayed
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the tendency to consider the Baltic States as a single entity as “poorly fitting, externally
imposed category” and called into question such phenomenon as the Baltic identity,
claiming that there was nothing uniting three “very different” countries, “with completely
different affinities” in the Baltic area: neither common culture nor language group or
religious tradition. 165 Eroding ties between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and denying
Estonia’s belonging to the group of three Baltic States, Ilves attempted to marginalize
Estonia’s Soviet past and deliberately distance the country from other Balts. Estonian
political elite wanted to demonstrate that Estonia was different, not like other former Soviet
Union republics most commonly characterized as backward and underdeveloped. The last
phases of the “application” period identified a change of the dominant narrative directing
the “return to Europe” discourse: the old foundational narrative of the independent First
Republic has been gradually replaced by the new “success story” that praised economic and
democratic developments of post-communist transitional stage.166

Stage III: Negotiation

The beginning of this stage was marked by the entering into force of the Europe
Agreement (1st of February 1998) and the subsequent opening of the membership
negotiations in March of the same year. The conditional end of the phase was the
completion of the accession negotiations between the EU and Estonia at the Copenhagen
Summit in December 2002. However, it would be wrong to consider the period of
negotiation finished by the closing of all the chapters of the acquis communautaire. In this
study, the negotiation stage is prolonged until Estonia’s entering into the EU in May 2004.
During this period, a number of important events happened: the Treaty of Accession was
signed on 16th of April 2003 and the Estonian European Union membership referendum
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was held on 14th September 2003.167

Estonia’s main strategy in the negotiations with the EU was to present itself and
maintain an image of “the best student in the class”, or, using the official EU’s terminology,
to implement the acquis communautaire168 in full by the date of accession. 169 Among the
fifth wave candidates, Estonia had always had an image of the most eager country to join
the EU. Estonia tried to be the best and quickest in “doing its homework”. Estonian
political elite understood that in order to become a member of the EU, great efforts should
be made. As the Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar explained: “Brussels is not Moscow,
we could not resort to the gift of the gab or any tricks. We needed to work hard.”170 By that
statement, Mr. Laar presented the nature of the Soviet Union – unpredictable, unfair, tricky
– as a total opposite to the demanding, but fair European Union. Also, he emphasized
Estonia’s willingness to become a part of the democratic world. However, such parallels
between the EU and the Soviet Union might in fact be quite risky; confrontation of the
center in Moscow and Brussels portrays latter as democratic, though still hegemonic
authority. The Foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves also used a method of drawing
parallels between the European Union and the Soviet Union to emphasize the benefits and
positive role of the former and discredit even more the latter. Defending certain EU
practices that in the media were often called “the stupidities associated with EU policy,”
Ilves made an immediate reference to the Soviet Union; comparing those two, he argued
that for successful functioning of the genuine Union of sovereign nations [the EU] a
compromise was needed. Thus, the minister encouraged Estonian people as well as other
candidate states to be tolerant towards certain policies, standards, norms or requirements
167
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imposed by the EU that sometimes might be not preferred or even disliked by one country,
but are necessary for other member states.171 Also, Ilves regarded the acceptance of Estonia
to begin negotiations with the EU as a clear indicator that the state “genuinely ceased to be
a “former Soviet republic.”172
In order to distance Estonia from its Soviet past and its symbols, the Estonian
political elite took a more persistent course directed on rapprochement with the Nordic
countries, the “true” Europeans. As it has already been mentioned before, Estonia was not
positive anymore about its belonging to the family of the Balts and tried to separate itself
from them. Among the Estonian political elite, Ilves was especially skeptical about such
phenomena as a common Baltic identity. He argued that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania just
did not have it. The only element that tied three countries together was their common
negative, “unhappy”, “imposed from the outside” Soviet experience: occupations,
deportations, annexation, sovietization, collectivization, russification.173 According to Ilves,
psychologically and culturally Estonia belonged to so called Yule-land, together with
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the British Islands. The minister stressed
that Estonia has much more in common with this group of countries than with Latvia and
Lithuania. Referring to the term Yule-land, Ilves indicated the similarities among the
countries that share this cultural entity. As an example, Ilves demonstrated how the word
Christmas is expressed in national languages of the countries belonging to the Yule-land
and showed the difference with two other Baltic States and Russia. The word Christmas
means Jõul in Estonian, Joulu in Finland, Jul in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Jol in Iceland,
Yule on the British Isles. In contrast to Yule-land countries, Latvians call Christmas
Ziemastvetki, Lithuanians – Kaledos, and Russians – Рождество [Rozhdestvo].
Among other factors that demonstrate Estonia’s belonging to the Yule-land, are
particular cultural and mental characteristics, such as stubbornness, rationality, pragmatism,
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tendency to work hard. Also, Yulelanders have similar levels of development in the area of
Information and Communication Technologies – they are the best in the world in Internet
connections and in mobile phone penetration. Furthermore, Yule-land countries have the
lowest levels of corruption worldwide. According to Ilves, Estonia, often regarded as a
backward former “Soviet Republic,” outperformed in these areas not only other former
communist countries, but also leading European powers, such as Germany and the United
Kingdom for example.174 Ilves also noticed that Estonians were the only ones who were
able to break down the initial prejudices of the EU toward the “former soviets” and
presented the popular image of Estonians as the “new Finns.”
In a broader perspective, there has always been a moment of competitiveness with
others in the Estonia’s “return to Europe” discourse. Emphasizing its achievements and
eligibility for starting negotiations to join the EU, the Estonian political elite constantly
demonstrated that its country was able to surpass not only its closest neighbours, the former
Soviet Republics, but also other states of the former communist bloc. Among the potential
members from the fifth wave Cyprus and Malta were two countries without Soviet
inheritance. Presenting Estonia’s success as comparable only with Cyprus’, politicians tried
to marginalize Estonia’s communist past and present its level of development as very close
to a candidate state unburdened by the Soviets and thus more “Western:” “Estonia has
made rapid progress. With 16 chapters closed in negotiations, we have lost only to Cyprus
that exceeded us by just one chapter. Estonia has been able to increasingly assert itself.”175
Some of the Estonian political figures stressed the exceptionality of Estonia even
more, resorting to some strange comparisons. Thus, for example, the Prime Minister Mart
Laar came up with such an argument: “Estonia is the only country among her counterparts
where the recollection of a 2-rouble sausage does not conceive nostalgia for the warm
shelter of a rotten empire. Estonians are the most optimistic people about their future in the
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entire Europe.”176
Appeal to the Estonian people in the context of European integration had a special
place and was of particular importance in case of Estonia. As in any democratic society, the
wish of people had to be taken into account when the country was on the edge of some
important changes. The Estonian people had to make a final decision whether Estonia
would join the EU or not. For that purpose, a referendum on joining the EU had to be
carried out in all candidate countries. The aim of the referendum was to clarify the level of
public support for the integration. Among all countries from the fifth wave of Eastern
enlargement, Estonia’s case has been unique in terms of discrepancy of the political elite
and public opinion towards the joining of the EU. In a country, reported and presented to be
one of the most willful and diligent candidates to enter the EU, the level of public support
has always been one of the lowest. For example, according to the Eurobarometer report that
was made in March-May 2003 (some months before the referendum on 14th of September
2003), at least every sixth Estonian citizen considered EU membership as a bad thing and
in general Estonians were described as “almost as unfriendly towards the Union as the
notoriously frosty Brits.”177 Therefore, the EU issue and the coming referendum in
particular was a great challenge for the Estonian political elite in many ways. First, they
had to convince Estonians of the positive influence and benefits that membership would
bring. Second, they had to do it in a way that would not leave an image that the choice of
Estonians was manipulated or prescribed by the ruling elite. In that case, it would put into
question the level of democratic development of Estonia and also create associations with
the Soviet time when everything was decided for people by small political elite. Resorting
to different rhetorical methods, Estonian politicians tried to present the European choice of
people as their independent position. Stressing Estonia’s achievements made in the period
of post-communist transition, politicians placed them in the context of European integration
and emphasized the role of ordinary people in that process: “Estonia’s success is not
attributable to any political party or fraction, but to the people of Estonia,” “It is not
politicians or government officers that accede to the European Union, but the State and
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people of Estonia,” “All citizens of Estonia, from countrymen to businesswomen will be
citizens of the European Union.”178 The president of the Republic, Arnold Rüütel, portrayed
a possibility to decide whether Estonia will become a Member State of the EU as a unique
chance that history had given to the Estonian people to choose their destiny. In Rüütel’s
speech, a “Yes” vote was associated with stability and access to the richest common
market, whereas a “No” vote – with the critical changes in Estonian domestic and foreign
policy. Complementing his arguments by description of all benefits and support that the EU
already gave and would give to Estonia in case of “Yes” vote, the president presented the
EU as a vital element in solving the problems left to Estonians by the years of
occupation. 179 To counter widespread fears that membership in the EU might partly deprive
the Estonian nation of its sovereignty and threaten its culture and national identity, Rüütel
reassured Estonians that the EU would help to preserve and strengthen their national
culture. Also, he claimed that membership would provide Estonia with an opportunity to
express its opinion on matters significant for Europe matters and also share Europe’s joys.
All those things are especially significant for the Estonian people since they “have
experienced the lack of it in the past.”180
Encouraging people by the success stories of Finland and Sweden, the advantages
the membership brought to them and assuring people of the safety of joining the EU by
using an example of those countries, politicians appealed to Estonian population to make a
choice for high living standards and increased level of security – an image of (Northern)
Europe.181 Portraying Estonia as a part of the Nordic countries, as a potential member of
the prosperous and stable EU, politicians reinforced the positive Estonia’s Self as well as
positive European/Nordic Other by making references to the negative image of the Russian
(Soviet) Other. Estonians were “no longer members of suffering, miserable and helpless
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nation, but of a nation capable of successful integration with the West.”182 Estonia’s
economic success and achievements in the filed of Information and Communication
Technologies development were seen as preconditions assuring Estonia potential in the
Western Europe.
The “success story” and innovative achievements of Estonia caused a
transformation of the dominant national narrative. From the recent victim of the Soviet
regime, from a “small country that could” Estonia was transformed into a “Baltic tiger”,
though “tiny”, but still a “tiger.”183 That new image was strong enough to challenge the old
foundational narrative which placed the First republic of Estonia at the heart of the nation
and its national pride. Since then, the main expression of Estonia’s national pride was its
incredible economic success.184 In order for national sovereignty to survive and flourish,
this new source of national pride should be secured.185 Membership in the EU provided the
best opportunity for national pride that time. Estonia was proud of its success and the
rhetoric of political elite changed to reflect this. Before, in the core of Estonia’s discourse
of “returning to Europe” was a strategy to be “the best student in the class” who was able to
learn and adopt European standards very quickly and successfully. Estonia’s self-image of a
“tiny tiger” increased the country’s self-confidence; now the Estonian political elite
claimed that the country could and should not only to learn from Europe, but also teach
Europe. Estonia wanted to share its experience and achievements with other countries,
foremost with less developed Commonwealth of Independent States186 and Balkan
countries, but also with developed Western countries. According to Lehti, it has been
argued that Estonians and other Balts were more efficient and more successful in carrying
out their reforms than the old, more established Western European states.187 Also, Estonia
was definitely ahead of many them in some innovative sectors, such as development of
182

Laar, Budapest, 1 November 2000.
Kristiina Ojuland, Tiny Tigers Will Always Be Tigers. Berlin [Germany]: 15-16 November 2002.
184
“We see also our economy developing and trade flowing towards the European Union. Definitely, we see
the achievements in culture and science, which promoted and familiarised us from Lapland to Portugal. It is
amazing that small Estonia has accomplished all this” (Arnold Rüütel, Remarks at the Flag-raising Ceremony
to Mark in front of Kadriorg Palace. Tallinn [Estonia]: 1 May 2004).
185
Lehti, 2006, 83.
186
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional organization of the former Soviet Republics.
187
Lehti, 2006, 83.
183

58

Information and Communication Technologies. As the minister of foreign affairs, Kristina
Ojuland, has argued: “Estonia has on the basis of its reforms and progress acquired enough
self-confidence to be able to address with an innovatory spirit also the matter of reforming
the European Union […] The future development of Europe will be dependent upon our
joint endeavours as IT tigers.”188 Ojuland also added that Estonia’s progress and its
influence on other countries would improve Europe’s competitiveness with the United
States.
The president Rüütel was of the same opinion about the potential advantages that
Estonia could bring to Europe. A decade ago, Estonia had already played a great role in
transforming Europe and turning it to the path of democratic development. According to
Rüütel, the Baltic States were among the main contributors to the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Restoring their own independence, the Balts set
prerequisites for other nations to become independent.189 Ten years after, the situation
repeated. A “tiny Baltic tiger” Estonia again was establishing preconditions for
transformation of Europe, now from the perspective of implementation and propagation of
knowledge-based development: “we bring into the European Union our knowledge and
experience, our traditions and culture. This will enrich the Union.”190
Talking about the main reasons that determined success for Estonia, Prime Minister
Laar argued that those laid not in the some external conditions, but in the change of
people’s mentality. Typical characteristics of the Soviet era – collectivism and persecution
of nonstandard (non-socialist) way of thinking – were replaced by new patterns of
individual thinking and opportunity to take initiatives and resolve one’s own problems
individually. The spirit of Estonians, “spoiled by the socialist heritage” was now on its way
to normality, and integration with the EU could create conditions to maintain that
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normality. 191 The minister of foreign affairs Ilves also admitted that the mentality and
psychology of Estonians had started to change. As an example, Ilves referred to a case that
happened with one professor from the University of Tartu.192 That case was an indicator
that with every new generation, the remembrance and knowledge of young Estonians about
the Soviet past of their country is declining.

However, such developments are not necessarily positive. Every nation should
know its history, both positive and negative periods of it. As a famous Estonian poet, Juhan
Liiv, said: “he who does not know his past lives without a future.” A number of Estonian
politicians used this aphorism in their speeches.193 This phrase demonstrates Estonia’s
stance in memory politics and explains the behaviour of its political elite. Complementing
that quotation by a saying of the well-known in memory studies Spanish American poet and
philosopher George Santayana: “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it,” it is possible to understand the main “doctrine” Estonian memory politics is
based on. As the Prime Minister of Estonia, Juhan Parts, noticed: “we must look into our
past in order to see where we have arrived today. We must also look into our past in order
to determine our future.”194 The attempts of the Estonian political elite directed on bringing
communist crimes into public discussion in order to investigate them, evaluate their
influence and possible implications confirm the functioning of that doctrine. Estonia does
not want those crimes to be repeated in any place of the world. Also, examination and
international recognition and condemnation of communist crimes are important for the
Estonia’s self-identification. Estonia can not employ the same principle as the great
European powers did after the defeat of Nazism, Estonia can not forgive the injustice done
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to it or reconcile with those who committed crimes against its people.195 Despite the fact
that the Soviet Union did not exist for twenty years already, despite all attempts made by
Estonian political elite to marginalize the Soviet past of their country by their economic
success or the status and image of a European country, despite all claims of Estonia
presenting the Soviet period as illegal, as an aberration – it might not help since the Soviet
legacy will nonetheless subconsciously dominate their self-identification.196 Therefore, the
issue of the Soviet inheritance in former communist republics – current members of the EU
should be examined, resolved and reconciled on the European level. As the Prime Minister
Parts fairly noticed, “Europe cannot have two memories, two histories.”197 Parts
demonstrated the great confidence that all members of the EU “should adopt a common
position regarding all totalitarian regimes and the crimes that they committed.”198
Estonia’s attempts to counterpoise the Nazi and Soviet crimes were expressed not
only in their equal investigation and condemnation, but also commemoration. In 2002,
following the example of other EU member states the government of Estonia made a
decision to declare the 27th of January as a memorial day for the Holocaust and other
victims of crimes against humanity. Together with this statement, the Prime Minister
referred immediately to the importance of paying attention to the victims of the Communist
regime on the mourning days on March 25th and June 14th.199
An interesting example which confirms the divergent vision of history in Estonia
and some Western European states was reflected in a speech by the Estonian Prime
Minister Mart Laar. According to Laar, the “greatest victory in the 20th century” was the
final demise of the criminal communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.200 Whereas
in the Western part of Europe the greatest victory of the 20th century was definitely defeat
of Hitler and Nazism in May 1945. It demonstrates the obvious gap in interpretation of
history of the 20th century in the countries of Western and Central and Eastern Europe. For
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the former, the foundation for collective memory lies in the experience of the World War II
period; for the latter, the postwar Soviet experience is more significant than that of World
War II. However, in order to tie Western Europe with Estonia’s own narrative, as well as to
demonstrate the unity that appeared between Western and Central and Eastern Europe when
fighting against the communist enemy, Laar expressed the common Estonian gratitude
towards the Western Powers “who refused to be blinded by the Red Smog and pressed [the]
Soviet Union to the corner” and “broke the backbone of the Soviet Empire.”201

Stage IV: Membership

Estonia’s entering into the EU in May 2004 was one of the most important chapters
of its history and definitely the most influential turning point in the Estonia’s discourse of
European integration. According to the foreign minister Ojuland, it signified the end of
country’s status of being a “nation in transition.”202 However, it was not “the end of
history” for Estonia, but rather a beginning of a completely new and much more demanding
era, entering into the phase full of greater responsibilities and commitments.203 The Prime
Minister Parts called the eastern enlargement of the EU as “the correction of an historic
injustice,” claiming that “with this step, the historic debt [to Estonia] has been repaid.”204
During that stage, Estonia continued with pursuing its main strategies of the
“success story” and “the best student in the class.” At that time, emphasis on the innovative
character of Estonia even increased. The Estonian political elite presented country’s
aspiration to bring about and spread its achievements, fresh new ideas of innovation to
other European States as an attempt to bolster the competitiveness of Europe.205 Estonia
wanted to prove that not only new member states benefited from joining the EU, but the
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EU itself received a number of advantages after the eastern enlargement. The political elite
portrayed enlargement as incredible improvement of security and prosperity that “the
divided Europe was never able to provide” and presented new members not as a burden or
challenge for the “old” Europeans, but as a solution to some problems of the EU that now
were referred as “our [common] problems.”206
Behind the tendency to increase its own significance for Europe and the EU was
also Estonia’s dissatisfaction with the status of a “new” member. Before membership, the
division of Europe into “old” and “new” parts was acceptable for Estonia (it was better than
distinction between “West” vs “East” or “true” vs “false” Europeans). After entering the
EU, the main goal of Estonian political elite was to eliminate that distinction: “talk of “old”
and “new” members will be confined to the pages of history.”207 For Estonia, the term
“new” Europe was a reference to its “otherness” in Europe, to its previous status of being
“European but not quite European.”208 It reminded Estonia of its Soviet inheritance, postSoviet identity and mentality, referred to its backwardness. In other words, those were the
symbols Estonia wished most to get rid of or at least marginalize by “returning to Europe”
and membership in the EU.
That strategy has been dominant in Estonia’s political discourse during the first
years of membership period. As the president of the Republic Toomas Hendrik Ilves has
stressed in his speech to the Estonian Jurists’ Forum in September 2010, Estonia has finally
returned to Europe.209 The President pointed out that from a poor country, “strangled by
communism”, Estonia changed into a democratic state that does not belong any more to a
problematic region requiring special care and a “hand to be held [sic].”210 Now Estonia is
the country that not only has an obligation to follow standards prescribed by others but also
participate in establishment of rules.
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Despite the fact that there is no need any more for Estonia to “follow rules
established in our regard by others,” Ilves admitted that Estonia still remains “a policytaker, not a policy-maker” in the EU decision-making process.211 One area Estonia
definitely would like to be a “policy-maker” is related to the introduction of legislation on
official recognition and condemnation of the communist crimes. When Estonia joined the
EU, its national memory became a part of the European collective memory. Though Estonia
has more opportunities now to bring that issue to the wider debate as well as claim that
“our history is your history and your history is our history” and demand from the European
and international community to pay more attention to the communist crimes, in fact the
activity of Estonian politicians is quite low.212 For example, when comparing the behaviour
of the members of the European Parliament from three Baltic States, Lithuanian
representatives show much more initiative with regards to the communist crimes topic than
Estonians do.
However, the situation is different on the domestic level. Politicians often appeal to
the illegality of the Soviet period and necessity to recognize the atrocities committed by the
Soviet regime. Right after joining the EU, in May 2004, the Prime Minister of Estonia
Juhan Parts honoured Estonia’s past and strength of Estonians who survived the “red night”
admitting that the Estonians who just entered the EU are “indebted to [their] past” and
persistence of their predecessors this new status. Parts, commemorating the victims of the
Soviet regime and signing a declaration which condemned the communist regime, also
appealed to European community, claiming that “Europe must condemn communism just
as it condemned Nazism during the Nuremberg trials.”213 Referring to the crimes of the
Soviet regime in Estonia as a “communist holocaust”, Parts noted that Estonia has to
investigate, explain and clarify the brutality of the totalitarianism to the larger European
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community. 214 He pointed out the importance of the condemnation of communism as a
criminal regime not only in different international organizations (such as the European
Parliament), but also in the minds of the international public, of Western civilization.
The minister of foreign affairs, Kristiina Ojuland, came out with a less emotional
and rather pragmatic position towards the necessity of recognition of the Soviet inheritance.
Ojuland pointed out that both Estonia’s and the EU’s relations with the Russian Federation
would be positively influenced “by the international condemnation of the crimes committed
by Communist regimes, and by Russia’s admittance of the past.”215 The current president of
Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has contributed significantly to international recognition of
the Soviet crimes. In 2007, the President suggested an idea to find out and commemorate
all Estonian victims of communism, by name.216 Another initiative of Ilves was foundation
of the Estonian Memory Institute. The main purpose of the institute was to educate
Estonian public about the human rights situation and their violation in Estonia under Soviet
occupation as well as examine the implication of those violations for Estonia.217 Also, the
institute should bring this subject onto the international stage and facilitate discussion of
the communist heritage and crimes in Europe. Ilves also played a role in foundation of the
International Virtual Museum of Communism Victims in Washington D.C. Estonia was the
first country which supported financially the museum, whose mission was to inform the
international public about the communist history, heritage, and crimes. 218 In 2008, the
President of Estonia and the former President of Poland stood out with the joint declaration
calling European countries to create an international commission to assess and investigate
communist crimes in Europe. According to Ilves and Kaczynski, that problem had always
been treated as a secondary “historical” issue in Europe, despite the fact that it affected
nearly one fourth of European citizens. Appealing to the common compliance to the
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principles of moral right and justice, the Presidents argued that “only in this way can we
heal the remaining scars that even today divide us.”219

Though Estonia’s joining the EU has significantly increased its aspirations to bring
communist crimes into surface, at the same time Estonia has tried to demonstrate respect
towards the common principles of the European collective memory as well. In contrast to
the Western European countries, the end of World War II brought Estonia neither freedom
nor peace. The 8th of May 1945 celebrated in Western Europe as the Victory Day over
Nazism has a totally different meaning for Estonians (the beginning of the Soviet
occupation). Despite this fact, the Estonian political elite always showed its solidarity with
other members of the EU in recognizing the significance of that day for Europe.
Commemorating all victims of the war together with its European counterparts, Estonian
politicians often appeal to reconciliation as a primary means to overcome the painful
past.220 As the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip said, citing the second president of
Estonia, Lennart Meri: “all wars end twice. First – when armed conflict ends. Second –
when enemies reconcile.”221 The current president of Estonia Ilves amended that argument
by claiming that for Estonia World War II ended on 31st of August 1994, when foreign
troops left the Estonian soil.222 At the same time, Ilves stressed that people of Estonia are
going neither to forget the injustice that occupation forces did to their country nor
“reconcile with those who committed crimes against their own and other peoples during the
war.”223

Another aspect of memory politics that distinguishes Estonia from the rest of
Europe is the importance and meaning of the Holocaust. In contrast to Western Europeans,
who perceive the Holocaust as universal, deserving a status of the “foundational event” of
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the European collective memory, in Estonia the Holocaust gets little attention and has never
become a subject of larger debate.224 During World War II, Estonia was the only country
which got a label “judenfrei” (free of Jews) at the Wannsee Conference in 1942, when the
fate of European Jewry was officially decided.225 In fact, the Jewish community in Estonia
was small and indiscernible; it could explain why many Estonians consider the Holocaust
as a superimposed discourse without any connection to their country. 226 Also, under the
communist regime, the mass extermination of the Jewish population was presented by the
Soviet propaganda machine as murders of peaceful Soviet citizens by Nazi occupiers.
The Holocaust posed a threat to the Estonian national narrative of sufferings under
communist rule, as the Jews, marginalized as a minority, claimed the status of victims,
otherwise assigned for the titular population. 227 The myths of Judeo-Bolshevism have been
quite strong in Estonia. Those stereotypes and perceptions of the Holocaust carried over
into the post-communist transition period.228

During the last stages of post-communist transition and European integration (the
periods of “negotiations” and “membership”) the Estonian political elite always showed its
own Europeaness and adherence to the Europeans norms, traditions and foundations. As
the Holocaust has a great significance for European collective memory and history, Estonia
also demonstrated its solidarity with that issue. Europe is a positive Other for Estonia, and
the latter is trying to adopt different European practices and norms as a role model, as a
standard to aspire. Estonia takes part in commemoration of the innocent victims on the
International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27th, the Holocaust is taught during
history lessons as a part of Estonia’s national core curriculum for basic and secondary
education, Estonia has participated in the Task Force for International Cooperation on
224
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Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research since 2007. 229 However, the Estonian
political elite often uses the term Holocaust to draw more attention to painful issue of the
Soviet crimes, and necessity of their recognition and remembrance worldwide. The most
common ways are drawing parallels between the sufferings of the Jews under Holocaust
and Estonians under communism (as, for example, Parts’ references to the “communist
Holocaust” mentioned above). The practice to mention communist crimes and sufferings of
the Estonian people when mourning or commemorating the Holocaust or World War II
victims are also widespread. The Prime Minister Ansip while paying tribute to the victims
of the Nazi regime during the International Holocaust Remembrance Day did not fail to
mention that “Estonia too suffered during and after the Second World War under totalitarian
regimes and we paid for this with our independence.”230 The President Ilves compared the
Soviet vision of the occupation as the liberation of Estonia 231 with the concept of Holocaust
denial. 232 An important element of the Holocaust debate is Estonians’ collaboration with
occupiers, in particular, their role in the Holocaust. The Estonian political elite do not deny
that during World War II there were Estonians who collaborated with the Nazis and took
part in the Holocaust atrocities.233 However, the Estonian veterans who had served in the
German army often present their cooperation with Germans as a struggle “against
Bolshevism and for the restoration of Estonian independence.” 234

229

Estonia Becomes Member of Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education,
Remembrance and Research, 05 December 2007.
230
Andrus Ansip, Statement on International Holocaust Remembrance Day. 27 January 2007.
231
Russian memory narrative.
232
“It is quite obvious that an Estonian can by no means accept as his liberator a regime that has committed
mass crimes against humanity. It must be realised that atrocities were perpetrated in Estonia and to call them
liberation is on par with the negation of the Holocaust“ (Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Interview to “Eesti
Päevaleht”: “We Have Too Few Surviving Men.” Tallinn [Estonia]: 22 February 2008).
233
“These reminders are painful for all humanity and particularly painful for this generation of Estonians
who, free again after years of suffering under the Nazi and Soviet occupations, have opened up to the world
and recognized that there were also Estonians among those who collaborated with the Nazis and participated
in committing the murders of Holocaust” (Siim Kallas, Remarks at the US Capitol. Washington, D.C. [United
States]: 4 September 2002).
234
Melchior and Visser, 39.

68

To sum up, Estonia’s discourse of “returning to Europe” is a good example that
demonstrates the interaction between memory and political power. The conducted analysis
of speeches showed the ability of politicians to direct the discourse on European integration
relying on and making appeals to the collective memory of Estonian people. The findings
of the analysis proved the assumption of the study. In fact, the Estonian political elite
representatives were able to present the Soviet experience of their country in the context of
European integration as a mean to break away and to maintain the continuity with the
communist past. In the former case, politicians attempted to distance Estonia from its
Soviet past stressing the Europeaness of the country and contrasting the images of positive
Self (Estonia) and positive Other (Europe/Nordic countries) to the negative Other
(Russia/the Soviet Union). At the same time, the political elite constantly recalled the
Soviet regime demanding international recognition of the communist crimes.
Furthermore, the Estonian politicians integrated successfully the discourse of
European integration into the dominant memory narrative of the nation. As Heidemarie Uhl
claims, political influence might go even further and transform collective memory narrative
and collective identity within the frame of social power structures they created.235 Estonia’s
case confirmed this argument. During the different stages of post-communist transition, the
Estonian political elite representatives have replaced the backward-looking political
discourse by forward-looking. If in the beginning stages their main arguments directed on
distancing Estonia from its Soviet past and supporting Europeaness of the country were
appeals to the legal continuity with the pre-war First Republic, then in the following phases
the primary legitimating source was future-oriented image of the innovative nation. In fact,
Estonia’s example has demonstrated that memory could perform as a “symbolic” and
“structural” power in politics.
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CONCLUSION

Estonia’s post-war national memory narrative is divergent from the European
collective memory narrative. If the end of the War meant victory and peace for Western
Europeans, for the Eastern part it marked the beginning of almost half of a century of
occupation under the communist regime. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia
took the road of “returning to Europe,” or “returning to the West.” First of all, it represented
Estonia’s attempts to gain recognition of the international community to its status of
independent state. Later, that foreign policy aspiration received sharper focus, reflecting
Estonia’s efforts towards membership in the EU. Estonia, “the best student in the class,”
has always had an image of a fast learner of European practices and one of the most eager
candidates to join the EU. The main reasons for such behaviour were economic, and
undoubtedly, security calculations, since Estonia is a small periphery state which has a
direct border with the large and powerful Russian Federation, its former oppressor. Besides
the abovementioned factors there were also some psychological predicaments. Estonia did
not want to have a status of post-Soviet Republic and be associated with the Soviet
mentality, backwardness and other characteristics of a “false” Europe. The country wished
to “return to Europe,” to become a “normal,” “true” European state.

The main purpose of this study was to examine the role of the Soviet legacies and
national memory on the formation of political discourse and the process of European
integration of Estonia. The study was built on the assumption that the Estonian political
elite use the Soviet experience of the country for two separate purposes. On the one hand,
the Soviet past was often presented as an accelerator of Estonia’s achievement in the postSoviet period and as an indicator of the “Europeaness” of Estonia. A status of the “true”
European state allowed politicians to distance their country from the backward,
undemocratic Russia and to replace the Soviet past of Estonia by European present. On the
other hand, the Soviet experience induced the Estonian political elite to demand
international recognition and condemnation of the communist crimes as it was done with
the Nazi crimes after World War II.
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The study aimed to clarify the abovementioned assumption and find out whether it
was justified or not. The main goal of the analysis was to observe the dynamic of postcommunist development of Estonia and formation of political discourse of the country in
the transitional period through the prism of memory politics. The empirical data for the
analysis was a selection of speeches delivered by three representatives of the high politics:
the head of state of the Republic of Estonia – the President, the head of government – the
Prime Minister, and the head of the Foreign Ministry – the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
period of analysis, 1991-2011, was divided into four stages: “de-Sovietization,”
“application,” “negotiation,” and “membership.” The analysis demonstrated different trends
in framing the political discourse during each of those phases and also indicated some
changes that appeared in the course of transitional period.

The findings of the analysis proved the research assumption. In fact, the Estonian
political elite often appeal to the national memory of Estonians as well as the Soviet past of
the country in order to legitimize certain political decisions, to emphasize or, on the
contrary, avoid particular aspect of one or another event. The Soviet Union (and also the
Russian Federation after the collapse of communism) has gained a stable position of the
negative Other for Estonians and the collective memory of the nation. By contraposing
negative Other to the positive Self, or positive Other (Europe, the European Union, Nordic
countries) the Estonian political elite wished to distance the country from its Soviet past.
The conceptual pair of positive Self/negative Other allowed politicians to emphasize even
more some of the positive aspects related to Estonia’s development in post-communist
period as contrasted to the country’s existence under the Soviet dominance. Also, such
contradistinction provided Estonia with credentials to present itself as a “true” European
country, not a part of the “false” Europe, a former communist state. The contrast between
positive Other and negative Other showed Europe and the European Union in the very
positive light, as opposed to the totalitarian Soviet Union. Such comparison was sometimes
used when the political representatives wanted to legitimize some harsh reforms or EUrelated policies that might cause dissatisfaction among population. Sometimes, the Soviet
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experience was presented as a mean to justify some imperfections in Estonia’s own
policies. Most commonly, though, the negative Soviet experience was supposed to
emphasize whether success of Estonia during the transitional period or reinforce the
positive image of Europe with the main aim to shift the perception of Estonia as a postcommunist country and distance it from the Soviet past.
Another aspect of the Soviet past that Estonian politicians always stressed and tried
to incorporate into the political discourse were communist crimes and demand for their
international recognition and condemnation. Drawing attention on the illegality of the
Soviet occupation that deprived Estonia’s freedom and distanced the country from the
“true” Europe for almost a half of a century, the Estonian politicians appealed to the
European community to equalize communist crimes with Nazis’ and reassure the proper
investigation of the former.

The findings of the analysis showed a development that is seemingly a paradox. The
Estonian political elite representatives attempted to move away and maintain continuity
with the Soviet past at the same time. Those two lines have been running parallel during the
whole post-communist period. Estonian politicians always stressed Estonia’s belonging to
Europe; Estonia’s discourse on “returning to Europe” was in fact a return to its “natural
home.” In order to confirm the “Europeaness” of Estonia, elite representatives always
emphasized in their speeches the common democratic values and traditions both Estonia
and Europe were based on. Going back to 16th and 17th centuries, they constantly reminded
about cultural ties connecting Estonia with Western European states. Even foreign
dominance by those states was presented as positive and beneficial for Estonia. At the same
time, politicians continued to emphasize the illegality of the Soviet occupation and the “age
of Darkness” it brought to Estonians. Estonia’s belonging to the family of three Baltic
States – one of the strongest legacies of the Soviet past – was also marginalized, especially
during the second and third stages of transition. Some of the representatives of the political
elite denied the whole existence of such phenomenon as Baltic identity and tried to replace
it by another regional affiliation, the Nordic or Scandinavian identity.
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The analysis also revealed some shifts in the political discourse – gradually, from
the backward-looking it became transformed into forward-looking. If in the beginning of
the transitional period Estonian politicians relied mainly on continuity with the First
Republic 1918-1940 when framing the discourse, then after several years of development
and series of successful reforms, the main focus started to move gradually from past
towards future. The narrative looking back to history and praising the First Republic was
replaced by a narrative of a future-oriented innovative nation. The change of strategies, or
images Estonian politicians used to present the country, illustrated the shifts that appeared
in the political discourse.
During the first, de-Sovietization, stage the country followed a strategy of
“victimization.” Stressing the illegality of Soviet occupation, the Estonian people’s
sufferings under the criminal communist regime, and referring to the Soviet period as to an
era of “aberration,” the Estonian political elite sought above all the international protection
for the fragile status of their newly independent Republic. During the second stage, Estonia
felt more confident. Successful economic and political reforms, and also admission of
Estonia into the first wave of negotiations to join the EU transformed Estonia’s image from
the victim into “a small country that could.” During the third stage, Estonia tried to
consolidate its place and importance in Europe with further economic success and
outstanding achievements in the field of Information and Communication Technologies,
presenting itself as a “Baltic Tiger.” In the fourth stage, Estonia continued with that image,
stressing the innovative character and potential of Estonia. Now the country felt sufficiently
confident, mature and developed to emphasize its willingness to transmit its achievements
and “teach” Western European countries. Partly, it was done in order to eliminate still
existing in Europe division into “old” and “new” members. Belonging to the group of
“new” European states was seen by the Estonian political elite as a reference to “otherness”
and a reminder of its Soviet past – one of the main labels Estonia wished to overcome and
replace by its European present and future.

To counter the widespread fears that membership in the EU posed a threat to the
national identity of the country, the Estonian political elite often emphasized the opposite
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trend. They argued that European integration and a status of a member actually have
strengthened Estonian national identity. In case of a small country it might be really the
case. The European Union provides more opportunities for Estonia to make itself heard and
present its position internationally. The findings of this study provide a good basis whether
for further research on the same topic or for extended investigation. For example, it is
possible to add a component of identity to the existing framework and observe how three
types of identity – national, regional and European – interact and influence each other in
the case of Estonia.
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